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FOREWORD
During the past 2 decades, America and the world 
have witnessed the ignoble rise and now-pending de-
struction of the al-Qaeda terrorist entity, one of the 
modern world’s most vicious and successful transna-
tional organizations. Scholars and national security 
personnel have dedicated vast resources to dissecting 
and analyzing al-Qaeda’s ideological, strategic, or-
ganizational, and tactical strengths and weaknesses. 
Notable in this entire debate, however, has been the 
repeated refrain among scholars and U.S. policymak-
ers that we have yet to design and execute a successful 
messaging campaign that effectively attacks and dele-
gitimizes al-Qaeda in the eyes of potential recruits. 
Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph is designed to 
address that present lacuna. It is not in the realm of 
so-called narrative, ideology, or a “war of ideas,” he 
states, but in the realms of Islamic law, jurisprudence, 
and U.S. foreign policy that this delegitimizing can 
and should be waged. First, it is al-Qaeda’s violations 
of the jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of 
the military jihad and also its reckless, catastrophic 
damage to the Islamic cause that most undercuts al-
Qaeda’s appeal. And second, our willingness to en-
gage in an honest and forthright appraisal of U.S. 
policies in the Muslim world, coupled with a genuine 
willingness to address long-simmering grievances, 
can also significantly undercut al-Qaeda’s appeal. 
It is incumbent, Kamolnick concludes, for national 
security decisionmakers to develop the motivation, 
capability, and sophistication to promulgate and exe-
cute a carefully calibrated messaging strategy on these 
bases. Kamolnick’s suggestion that al-Qaeda’s mass 
casualty terrorism violates the Islamic law of war and 
iv
that the key to dealing with al-Qaeda is a tractable 
clash of interests and not an intractable clash of civili-
zations is, if true, a welcome message indeed.
  
  DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
  Director
  Strategic Studies Institute 
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SUMMARY
The 9/11 Commission Report identifies three stra-
tegic objectives—decapitation, deradicalization, and 
hardening homeland security—as key to disrupting, 
dismantling, and ultimately defeating the al-Qaeda 
terrorist enterprise. Though the first and third have 
been notably successful, the second objective has been 
relatively less so. 
Approaches to counter-radicalization that rely 
on so-called “counterideological” or “counternarra-
tive” approaches miss their mark: they presume end-
ing al-Qaeda’s reign of terror requires that Islam as a 
religious faith delegitimize core Islamic and Islamist 
tenets, including key planks anchoring religious faith. 
They also fail to acknowledge and engage the breadth 
and depth of nonreligiously-motivated opposition to 
existing U.S. foreign and military policy, especially in 
the Middle East and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Final-
ly, and most specifically, counternarrative approaches 
unnecessarily burden this strategic objective by cast-
ing a net far too wide and capturing in it a vast Is-
lamic, Islamist, and salafist universe whose adherents 
are overwhelmingly morally repelled by al-Qaeda’s 
terroristic methods. 
Islam is a law-governed religious faith that pro-
scribes and prescribes human conduct. The jihad—the 
religious prescription to struggle and strive in the 
path/way of Allah until Allah’s word reigns supreme 
throughout the earth—including its military sense, is 
despite disavowal in popular piety and much modern 
moderate Islamic discourse, a binding religious pre-
scription. This presumption of an enduring obligation 
to wage the military jihad is an essential starting-point 
in potentially delegitimizing al-Qaeda’s reign of terror 
among adherents for whom shari’a compliance is an 
essential requirement. 
Recent important jurisprudential debates among 
jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several 
conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qae-
da’s terror as both unlawful and imprudent. The ma-
jority of those conclusions arise from recent decades 
of “prison debates” in Muslim-majority societies over 
the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics of vio-
lent rebellion against their own governments. 
These rulings are supplemented by others of vital 
relevance for undermining al-Qaeda terrorism direct-
ed principally against noncombatant civilians living 
in Muslim-minority societies. Among the latter, the 
most decisive legal rulings include the following: (1) 
murder is one of the gravest and forbidden of sins; 
(2) the impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and 
non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children, the 
elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3) the 
impermissible extension of the principle of Tartarrus, 
or human shields; (4) the impermissibility of treach-
ery, violation of oaths, and pacts of security granted 
(implicitly, or explicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim 
majority societies; (5) jihad is impermissible unless 
specific capacities, conditions, and circumstances are 
present; (6) permissibility to wage offensive jihad 
must be granted by parents and creditors; (7) imper-
missibility of violating a voluntary oath of uncondi-
tional allegiance and obedience (bay’at) given to one’s 
recognized ruler; (8) the impermissibility of waging 
offensive jihad under present conditions of Muslim 
weakness vis-à-vis the infidel powers; (9) the permis-
sibility of jihad, emigration, or a truce when facing 
infidel occupation; (10) the impermissibility of attack-
ing American civilians of an occupying country in the 
viii
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name of jihad or under its banner; and, (11) the impru-
dence of al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism. 
It is suggested that relevant policymakers give due 
regard to the key role that jihad-realist jurisprudential 
debates hold for contributing to the tactical implosion 
and marginalization of al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Those 
charged with strategic communication, public diplo-
macy, and counterterrorist messaging should develop 
the motivation, capacity, and sophistication to sys-
tematically analyze how jihad-realism and a jurispru-
dence of jihad, may be leveraged for, and not against, 
vital U.S. national security interests. 
Owing to present hostility directed in many quar-
ters against U.S. policies in the Middle East and Mus-
lim world generally, and the Israel-Palestine conflict 
in particular, however, it is extremely inadvisable for 
the United States to openly promote or publicize any 
of these initiatives. A key, indeed essential, ingredi-
ent for the authority of these findings is that they are 
viewed as absolutely untainted by any interest, factor, 
force, or power; rather, these debates rest on the legiti-
macy of the shari’a and involve credentialed actors of 
immense stature and learning.
It is advisable that the United States do everything 
within its power to make the case to the Muslim-ma-
jority countries, and the Muslim-minority populations 
in the Muslim diaspora, that as a country we are on 
the side of the lawful and the just, and we actively 
seek and promote solutions to long-simmering policy 
grievances. Our ability as a nation to openly associ-
ate with any efforts by internal Muslim actors must be 
deferred until the perception of our motivations is al-
tered, and altered fundamentally. No amount of spin 
or messaging matters when daily life and its common-
sense interpretation contradict official pretensions 
and pronouncements.

1DELEGITIMIZING AL-QAEDA:
A JIHAD-REALIST APPROACH
HOW AL-QAEDA ENDS
Disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating 
al-Qaeda based and inspired transnational terrorism 
is the declared policy of the U.S. Government.1 The 
9/11 Commission Report makes reference to three over-
arching strategies for defeating this enemy:2 attacking 
the al-Qaeda terrorist organization; preventing fur-
ther radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda; and 
protecting the homeland from future attack.3 
Evidence strongly suggests that decapitating al-
Qaeda4 and hardening homeland security5 are hav-
ing significant strategic effects.6 Far less success is 
claimed, however, for the prevention of radicalization 
and recruitment to al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorist 
campaign. This monograph supplies a distinct ap-
proach for partially accomplishing this elusive strate-
gic objective. 
It is important to note at the outset that prevent-
ing replenishment via incitement, radicalization, and 
recruitment to the al-Qaeda organization is only one 
of many factors associated with the certain decline 
and demise of terrorist campaigns, al-Qaeda included. 
Briefly, six variables individually or in some combina-
tion are predictors of terrorist organizational demise: 
decapitation, negotiations, success, reorientation, re-
pression, and failure.7 
Decapitation, along with hardened homeland se-
curity measures, has dramatically affected al-Qaeda’s 
capacity for launching its unique “brand” of violent 
extremism: complex, simultaneous, multiple-target, 
mass casualty terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. 
2homeland.8 Short of a complete revolutionary reorga-
nization of the global international order, al-Qaeda’s 
maximalist global violent extremist ambitions cannot 
succeed. Al-Qaeda’s global revolutionary terrorism 
also rules out negotiations; although a deliberate and 
sustained U.S. strategy of disaggregating al-Qaeda’s 
terrorist network suggests targeting select regional 
affiliates and associates for whom less ambitious po-
litical achievements (e.g., local, national, or specific 
policy grievance-based) are original drivers.9 Selective 
reorientation of al-Qaeda from disciplined global mass-
casualty violent extremist terrorism toward opportun-
ist criminality and less-ambitious Islamist militancy 
has occurred, though on a relatively minor scale.10 
Repression for our purposes is captured by the above 
discussion of decapitating the terrorist organization 
but is somewhat broader and encompasses attacking 
the organizational capacities of al-Qaeda to persist as 
an organized terrorist entity.11
While the above five correlates contribute in vary-
ing degrees to al-Qaeda’s dramatically-weakening 
present capacities, it is the sixth predictor—i.e., fail-
ure—that is the primary concern of this monograph. 
This is so because it most directly touches on that 
heretofore underaccomplished strategic objective 
noted in the 9/11 Commission Report: preventing radi-
calization and recruitment to al-Qaeda’s transnational 
terrorist campaign. Again, it is the intention of this 
monograph to contribute to that strategic objective vi-
tal to declared national policy through the calculated 
exploitation of failure as a known predictor of terror-
ist organizational decline and demise.
What is meant by terrorist failure as applied to al-
Qaeda? Failure here refers to a two-dimensional night-
mare scenario facing the al-Qaeda terrorist enterprise: 
3internal implosion and external marginalization. Indeed, 
these combined dimensions account for a significant 
swath of variance explained in terrorist failure: “Most 
terrorism ends,” Audrey K. Cronin claims: 
because the group employing the tactic fails and even-
tually disintegrates. The short life-span and limited 
success of most groups that use terrorism demonstrate 
that violence deliberately targeted against civilians re-
pels rather than attracts popular support. Indiscrimi-
nate killing creates a backlash and undermines politi-
cal staying power. Terrorism creates havoc, murders 
innocent people, draws morbid fascination; but it is 
insufficient to achieve political or social change.12
Evidence drawn from previous terrorist cam-
paigns indicates four pathways to internal implosion: 
(1) the failure to attract new generations of member-
ship and leadership; (2) in-fighting and fractionaliza-
tion; (3) loss of operational control;13 and, (4) offering 
exit ramps for marginal members seeking to separate 
from the organization.14 “Implosion,” Cronin states, 
“happens when there is in-fighting over the mission, 
operations, competition for dominance,15 differences 
of ideology, loss of interest among members—even 
simple exhaustion or burnout.”16 
Marginalization, on the other hand, signifies or-
ganizational isolation and distance from a broader 
mass of actual or potential supporters. “Groups that 
do not implode,” she continues, “may be cut off from 
their supporters. Marginalization occurs when there 
is a diminution of active or passive support, or even a 
popular backlash against the violence.”17 
From the above one may predict that terrorist 
groups end because they are terrorist groups. As a type 
of political violence—excepting those terrorists that 
4abandon terrorist means, reconnect to a broader mass, 
and transform into a legitimate insurgent or political 
entity—sustenance must become ever more perilous 
and fraught with all-too-human imperfections. As ex-
tremist outliers, they are isolated within, and there-
fore simultaneously inhabit the remotest outskirts and 
fringes of an imagined ideal, cause, or community they 
arrogantly presume to lead as vanguard. Further, they 
are marginalized by moral revulsion owing to the kill-
ing of innocents and the cold logic of a ruthless killing 
machine that lacks a pragmatic, hopeful, believable 
Other realizable by real persons in real time.18 
A JIHAD-REALIST JURISPRUDENTIAL  
APPROACH 
However distasteful to U.S. national security de-
cisionmakers, the presumption of Islamic suprema-
cism and a past-perfect Islamic utopian “golden age” 
in contrast to an age of pagan ignorance and infidel-
ity; belief in the exclusive right of the Islamic call and 
right to rule all of humankind; extremely-negative 
caricatures of certain features of present-day Western 
societies; and vehement opposition to U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East (and in particular what is 
regarded as a hypocritical embrace of democracy, 
support for autocracy, and one-sided support for Is-
raeli occupation) is professed by many observant and 
“non-jihadi” Muslims. On pragmatic grounds alone, 
therefore, it is inadvisable to presume that destroying 
al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism necessitates 
displacing Islamic supremacism and its essentially 
apologetic “narrative.”19 Moreover, though the ma-
jority of observant Muslims in daily popular piety 
disavows the religious prescription to wage military 
5jihad, the legal case upholding an enduring obligation 
to call others to Islam (da’wa); to wage the military ji-
had until the entire world proclaims the word of Allah 
supreme; and to enjoy the most privileged status and 
fruits awaiting a true mujahid in paradise, is, in fact, 
a compelling one.20 Neither popular piety, moderates, 
liberals, or modernists have to date, in the opinion of 
the present author, successfully refuted it.21 
In this monograph, a jihad-realist jurisprudential 
approach is operationalized as a tactical contribution 
to the imploding of al-Qaeda.22 This approach is po-
tentially of greater yield, however, since unlike those 
traditional categories of terrorist littering the political 
violence landscape (e.g., separatist, ethno-nationalist, 
communist, anarchist, or doomsday cults), al-Qaeda 
legitimizes its self-proclaimed right to wage jihad 
based on what it claims is a faithful adherence to Is-
lamic law. 
Islam is a strictly-monotheistic, law-centered, 
world religion. Its legal and moral principles are root-
ed in a revealed sacred scripture (Qur’an), traditional 
accounts of Prophet Muhammad’s life (Ahadith), and 
nearly 1,400 years of jurisprudential tradition. Aptly 
described as aspiring toward a universal divine no-
mocracy,23 all persons regardless of social status, class, 
race, sex, tribe, or family background are duty-bound 
to strive for righteous intention and conduct in daily 
life. In its orthodox Sunnite and Shi’ite forms, Islam 
is quintessentially a religion commanding lawful and 
forbidding lawless behavior.24 Islamic law also pre-
scribes a law of warfare, and for observant Muslims, 
the military jihad is a binding religious prescription.25 
There is no attempt in this monograph to deny, 
minimize, or otherwise obfuscate this martial religious 
prescription. In the opinion of this author, a genuinely 
6effective means for tactically imploding and marginal-
izing al-Qaeda—particularly in the eyes of those deep-
ly religiously-motivated potential recruits for whom 
religious law is a sine qua non for participation—must 
presume the validity of Islamically-prescribed mili-
tary jihad, and in those terms, objectively assess and de-
cisively refute the validity of al-Qaeda’s declaration of 
war and subsequent global terrorist campaign.26 This 
approach proposed by the present author is designed 
to target exactly the type of person to which Noman 
Benotman, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group vio-
lent militant ”jihadist” refers, when he states that for 
genuine dialogue to even begin, “The starting point 
has to be that jihad is legitimate, otherwise no one will 
listen.”27 Three essential additional premises must also 
be conceded if an Islamically-rooted legal case against 
al-Qaeda’s reign of terror is to be valid, namely first, 
that there is an absolute legal distinction between “le-
gitimate jihad and terrorism”;28 second, that terrorism 
is “haram” (forbidden);29 and third, in addition to be-
ing forbidden, “grave Sharia violations”30 have ac-
companied terrorist methodologies.31 
WAGING JIHAD: AL-QAEDA’S VIOLATIONS OF 
THE SHARI’A32 
 
A summary of select jihad-realist jurispruden-
tial objections raised against al-Qaeda based and in-
spired terrorism is provided.33 Before embarking on 
this task, however, it is crucial to understand that for 
those young seekers of truth and justice targeted by 
al-Qaeda’s tactical propaganda, taking jihad “off the 
table” means potentially leaving on the table a mas-
sive structure of injustice that still demands a remedy 
in their eyes. If not jihad, then what? If terrorism is 
7indeed impermissible, how then are Muslims to fight 
back? Consider the following three online posts in 
response to the republication of a letter34 by promi-
nent salafi Saudi Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, calling for 
a categorical condemnation of terrorism, regardless 
of motive or cause, without hesitation, “ifs,” “ands,” 
or “buts.”35 These were just three of 185 posts over a 
4-day period from al-Qaeda sympathizers (a distinct 
minority) to modern, justice-seeking, young western-
ized Muslims (the vast majority)—all convinced the 
Muslim world requires definite action in its defense. 
Naeem: Very nice article [Sheikh Oudah’s] and fol-
low-up comments [three other Sheikhs]. I like how it’s 
been made unequivocally clear what Jihad IS NOT. 
However, I’m convinced that we must simultaneously 
make clear what Jihad IS. Otherwise, confusion will 
persist. This article, while condemning the ill-advised 
actions and beliefs of many disenfranchised youth, 
does not allay their worries and concerns. The frustra-
tions are still there and are VERY REAL. Should we 
cease to be concerned about the oppressions [sic] fac-
ing the Muslim Ummah? If not, what avenues do we 
have open to us? If (combative) Jihad is one of them, 
then what type of Jihad-oriented activities and efforts 
should we be supporting? In what manner? It is in-
cumbent upon our scholars to not only teach us what 
is deplorable, but what is commendable, particularly 
in this very gray area of 21st century Jihad.36 
Yaser: Absolutely valid concern [raised by Naeem], 
and I believe it is the right of every Muslim, especially 
those in the west, to know what is the right and valid 
way of Jihad, away from any zealous spirit or apolo-
getic approach. I hope we can fulfill this request in 
future posts and articles insha’Allah [God willing].37 
8Mystrugglewithin: Naeem’s comment, and your 
[Yaser] feedback summarize everything that most of 
us here are concerned with.38 
It is clear that al-Qaeda’s “center of gravity” is a 
younger generation of savvy, justice-seeking recruits 
and, owing to this, that prominent shaykhs and ulema 
are attempting to argue that, yes, justice is supreme, 
but unjust means can never attain just ends. It is en-
try to Paradise itself that will be denied to those using 
sinful or criminal shortcuts—even if those actions are 
based in ignorance of one’s religion—and discounting 
genuine human costs. Shaykh al-Oudah clarifies these 
very consequences and the choice of two paths await-
ing these youth.
The merciful thing to do is to tell those young people 
who have been deceived, and those who are set to join 
their ranks tomorrow, that: ‘This path you are taking is 
not going to bring you to your goal. It will not save 
you from Hell or earn you Paradise. Whoever wants 
success in this life, salvation in the next, and Allah’s 
pleasure should adhere to the true teachings of Islam 
and keep far away from bloodshed and strife. Do not 
attempt to reinterpret the faith so as to justify acts 
that are clearly and patently evil. In the boldness with 
which you commit mortal sins, you engage in crimes 
far worse in Allah’s estimation than those whom you 
purport to condemn (italics added).’39 
Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl), 
imprisoned former senior shari’a scholar for the Egyp-
tian Jihad Organization and al-Qaeda’s former shari’a 
guide—whose guidelines for legal jihad we shall soon 
consider—also understands this center of gravity all 
too well. It is not difficult to read between these lines. 
To the question posed by Al-Hayah journalist Muham-
9mad Salah, “What advice would you give Muslim 
youths regarding jihad?” he replies:
You should know that jihad is right, but beware those 
who exploit the youths’ ignorance of their religion and 
their zeal for Islam, pushing them to engage in jihad for 
which the means and resources are not available. They 
end up in jails or getting uselessly killed. This allows 
those who trade in Muslim youths’ zeal to earn repu-
tation and donations. You must know that jihad has 
conditions and impediments, which must be carefully 
considered. The reasons for jihad in and of themselves 
are not sufficient to go to jihad, such as the presence 
of the enemy [in Muslim lands]. You should consider 
whose interest the jihad will serve. The Prophet, may 
God’s peace and prayers be upon him, said: ‘He who 
fights to elevate God’s word follows God’s path.’ This 
is an agreed upon Hadith. Do not leave your coun-
try and travel for jihad without permission from your 
Muslim parents. Do not move to a place without a full 
knowledge of circumstances.40 
And in the same interview, in response to Muham-
mad Salah quoting Egyptian radical fundamentalist 
and al-Qaeda member Muhammad Khalil al-Hakay-
imah who “on 26 September . . . said: ‘Young Muslims 
will only trust the fatwas of the shaykhs and ulema 
who advocate jihad’,” Sayyid Imam retorts: 
O Al-Hakayimah: When God Almighty said: ‘O Mes-
senger, rouse the Believers to the fight’ [Koranic verse, 
Al-Anfal 8:65], He ordered him to begin with himself. 
God Almighty says: ‘Then fight in Allah’s cause—
Thou art responsible only for thyself—and rouse the 
believers’ [Koranic verse, An-Nisa 4:84]. The Messen-
ger is a good example for us, for he led his companions 
in fighting. Quit the remote control electronic jihad, and 
come to set a good example for the people here, espe-
10
cially because you deny being powerless. Otherwise, 
your victims who are recruited on the internet will pur-
poselessly fill prisons, just because they believed you, 
unaware of the rule: ‘If you are my imam, you should 
stand in front of me in battle (italics added).’41
And even more emphatically, Sayyid Imam states:
My document [‘Rationalization’] will also save many 
Muslim young men from being lured by al-Qaeda over In-
ternet and being taught treachery and betrayal. It will save 
many of al-Qaeda’s current followers and admirers 
who will hasten to repent before they are betrayed and 
encouraged to be treacherous to others, something for 
which they would be punished on the Day of Judg-
ment. This document has caused some people to be re-
leased from jail and brought back happiness to many 
homes that had been living in sorrow. If the Muslims’ 
enemies profit from this, this is incidental and not the 
result of agreement just as they benefited from our 
participation in the Afghan jihad. Yet the Muslim peo-
ple’s benefit is greater. Not everything that benefits 
the enemy is to be disdained (italics added).42
Let us now consider the principal Islamic shari’a 
objections to al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism. 
We also briefly consider jurisprudential objections 
identified in this same literature that may ultimately 
prove more persuasive to potential recruits unmoved 
by strict compliance with often scholastically encum-
bered jurisprudential disputes, who seek concrete re-
sults manifest in tangible evidence of Muslim empow-
erment, well-being, and the expansion of the Islamic 
call. 
It is beyond the scope of the present monograph, 
and the competency of the present author, to enter into 
a detailed consideration of the entire chain of reason-
11
ing and jurisprudential proofs offered for each point 
listed below. Genuine shari’a scholars are required to 
glean from every issue they consider some combina-
tion of reliance on the primary sources—Qur’an, Ha-
dith, ijma, and qiyas—to derive valid legal opinions. 
The unrivaled source of authority in each dispute, 
barring corruption or circumvention of this process, 
is both the scholarly and jihadi reputation of the par-
ticipants to this debate, and their ultimate ability to 
prevail in the ongoing worldwide conversation about 
the jihad imperative in the 21st century. Especially 
key is the fact that these disputant scholars are uncon-
ditionally associated with the religious duty to wage 
jihad, and are untainted by any conflicts of interest, 
for example, service on behalf of regimes perceived 
to be self-serving who seek to undermine violent re-
bellion not on grounds of religion, but sheer regime 
survival.43 
These objections considered in their entirety 
amount to violations of what is in essence an Islamic 
law of armed conflict, including the right and duty to 
violent rebellion against an unjust ruler. These objec-
tions overlap, but naturally fall into two distinct clus-
ters. The first concern predominantly Muslim societies 
in which violent armed Islamist organizations wage 
what they claim is jihad against what they assert are 
“apostate” regimes (i.e., declarations of “takfir of the 
ruler” or regime). The rules governing jihad, declar-
ing one an apostate, and the many issues arising from 
targeting various kinds of person, are addressed here. 
The second cluster comprises those objections of 
greatest interest to those non-Muslim majority societ-
ies, including the United States, targeted by al-Qaeda’s 
reign of terror. Though some overlap exists with the 
first cluster, unique legal issues are raised, and shari’a 
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violations identified. It is this second cluster that is of 
greatest interest to citizens living in predominantly 
non-Muslim societies presently targeted by al-Qaeda. 
The Jihad-Realist Rejection of Violent Rebellion 
and Takfir.44
The following shari’a violations have been most 
consistently cited by an emergent consensus of jihad-
realist militant Islamists who have religiously dele-
gitimized violent armed conflict directed against their 
governments. 
1. The Impermissible Rejection of Scholarly Authority. 
This includes the failure to recognize the legitimate 
authority of learned Islamic experts and scholars on 
matters pertaining to shari’a, its legitimate methodol-
ogy, and as a corollary, the need for deep skepticism 
about persons whose scholarly credentials in shari’a 
are insufficient, particularly in such weighty matters 
as inflicting harm and violence on others.45 
2. The Impermissibility of Extremism and Fanaticism. 
Fanaticism, extremism, and immoderation violate 
explicit and unambiguous Islamic tenets and tradi-
tions. Immoderation is the gateway to violations of 
the shari’a, and most often results in undermining the 
interests and values of the Umma.46 
3. Murdering Muslims is Haram. Unlawfully mur-
dering Muslims is an absolute sin whose moral grav-
ity is second only to the denial of the singularity and 
sovereignty of Allah.47 
4. The Impermissible Declarations of Takfir. The im-
permissibility of takfir—declaring another Muslim 
an apostate and therefore rendering their lives and 
property forfeit—stressing especially its historic con-
sequence in undermining social solidarity, sowing 
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chaos, creating disorder, facilitating dissension (fit-
nah), and unleashing mayhem.48 
5. The Impermissibility of Violating the Lives, Property, 
and Honor of Non-Muslims Granted Promises of Security. 
An extensive jurisprudential literature exists regulat-
ing the permissible security granted non-Muslims vis-
iting or residing in Muslim lands. It is impermissible 
to target civilians involved in leisure, tourism, busi-
ness, or other affairs.49 
6. The Religiously Ignorant, Impermissible, and Prag-
matically Disastrous Isolation of Jihad as a Means of Pro-
moting Allah’s Word.50 This jihadism is characterized 
by unlawful, inadvisable risk-taking in matters of mil-
itary action, eschewing for example, legal and custom-
ary requirements bearing on such factors as the rela-
tive strength of one’s opponents; the relative capacity 
to wage jihad; the relative availability of less-costly 
options (i.e., da’wa, enforcing the good and forbidding 
evil, isolation, emigration, etc.),51 and the relative costs 
to the Umma. This imprudence is likely owing to fa-
naticism, extremism, and the placing of means before 
ends, each of which are rooted in religious ignorance 
or worldly desires. The inflicting of overwhelmingly 
burdensome costs has not only destroyed lives, prop-
erty, homes, and families in the short-run, but has also 
come at the expense of the longer-term benefits, val-
ues and abiding interests of the Umma.52 
7. Impermissibility of Rejecting the Modern State’s Pre-
rogative to Exercise Political Authority and Wage Jihad. 
The medieval circumstances dividing the world into 
Islamic (Dar al-Islam) and non-Islamic (Dar al-Harb; 
literally “Abode” or “House” of War) spheres, and el-
evating the role of Caliph and Caliphate, no longer ex-
ists. Collective Muslim majorities are now territorially 
organized into sovereign nation-states, and the state is 
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a political organ possessing a legitimate monopoly on 
the means and use of violence. If today jihad is to be 
declared and waged to discharge the lawful collective 
duty (fard kifaya) to conduct offensive jihad to expand 
the Umma, it can only be declared by a legitimate sov-
ereign on the basis of the shari’a.53 
8. Impermissible Extremism in the Exercise of the Right 
to Retribution (the “principle of justice”). Recall that the 
range of legal/moral permissibility for a given action 
is five-fold: absolutely required or commanded (fard); 
commendable or recommended, but not required 
(mustahabb); indifferent, neutral, permissible (mubah); 
discouraged or reprehensible, but not forbidden 
(makruh); absolutely and explicitly forbidden because 
both sinful and criminal (haram). Not only does Islam 
maintain that charity, mercy, and forgiveness are even 
greater virtues than mere retribution54—though that 
is certainly just and does restore a lawful reciproc-
ity—permissible conduct (i.e., retribution) has been 
replaced with terroristic conduct that is forbidden (ha-
ram).55
9. The General Impermissibility of Violent Rebellion 
Against a Ruler, and its Necessary Conditions Specified.56 
It is only under the most dire circumstances that the 
Muslim community would not be threatened in their 
lives, security, honor, and possessions by overthrow-
ing a ruler. Apostasy amounting to active disavowal 
of the Islamic creed and assisting the enemies of the 
Umma, are today the only sufficient grounds. 
The Jihad-Realist Rejection of al-Qaeda Based and 
Inspired Terrorism.57 
The above legal rulings apply most specifically to 
Muslim-majority societies that over past decades have 
faced violent Islamist rebellions in the name of jihad. 
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These rulings may be complemented with additional 
ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining al-
Qaeda’s reign of terror principally directed against 
noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority 
societies. The force of these legal objections does not 
lie in any kind of sentimentalism, but in a deeply-
embedded set of principles that legally regulate the 
military jihad. It is worth restating at the outset, before 
considering al-Qaeda’s chief violations, what a jihad-
realist jurisprudential approach is. Such an approach 
is succinctly stated by Sayyid Imam himself:
. . . [J]ihad is a continuing religious duty in the Nation 
of the Muslims, since Allah the Almighty ordained it 
and until the last one of them combats the imposter 
together with the Lord Christ [sic]58 peace upon him, 
at the end of time, as our Prophet Muhammad Allah’s 
prayers and peace upon him told us. The prophet de-
scribed jihad as “the peak of Islam’s hump,” for Allah 
preserves for the Muslims and their religion and their 
world, their pride and dignity here and in the Hereaf-
ter. Thus it is necessary to rationalize the understand-
ing of the religious duty of jihad.59 
What, then, are the cardinal shari’a objections 
raised against al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism? 
1. The Murder of Persons is Haram. Due to the sacred 
nature of all life—its absolute sanctity—persons must 
be secure in their lives, persons, property, possessions, 
and honor.60 
2. The Impermissibility of Targetting Muslims; and 
non-Muslim Civilians, Especially Women, Children, the 
Elderly, Scholars and Students of Knowledge.61 This is 
self-explanatory but bears repeating, since it is stated 
explicitly within the context of non-Muslim majority 
societies.
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3. The Impermissible Extension of the Principle of Tar-
tarrus (targeting human shields).62 The sanctity of life, 
and specific conditions that must be met for jihad to 
be waged, almost always render impermissible the 
killing of a Muslim, even if unintentionally. The juris-
prudence of justification has, however, violated these 
conditions in order to facilitate its unlawful terrorist 
activities.
4. The Impermissibility of Treachery, Violation of Oaths 
and Pacts of Security Granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to 
Muslims in Non-Muslim Majority societies.63 The ques-
tion of safe passage for non-Muslims in Muslim-ma-
jority societies was examined above. This deals with 
the security pact that governs the duty of Muslims 
who are provided the opportunity to enter, be secure 
in, and enjoy the liberties of life, property, possessions, 
and honor, in a non-Muslim society. 
5. The Impermissibility of Killing on the Basis of Nation-
ality. There is no precedent in Islam for killing persons 
on the basis of national affiliation. Since in the modern 
era Muslims may, and often likely will be, living in 
non-Muslim societies, this invites the potential killing 
of Muslims. However, its impermissibility rests on a 
broader religious tradition that, while distinguishing 
persons on the basis of faith, does not do so on the 
basis of territorial residency or citizenship. Osama bin 
Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s claim that they are 
targeting “Crusaders” in the “Crusader-Zionist” alli-
ance is shown to be another instance of the jurispru-
dence of justification.64
6. Jihad is Impermissible Unless Specific Conditions and 
Capacities are Present. Jihad is an enduring religious ob-
ligation. However, because of the seriousness of such 
a declaration—the equivalent of a declaration of war, 
in the West—waging jihad is only permissible if one 
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has taken explicit and careful account of the abilities, 
circumstances, conditions, and costs involved (rela-
tive to perceived benefits, and perceived alternative 
courses of action) that this religious prescription de-
mands.65 
7. Permissibility to Wage Offensive Jihad Must Be 
Granted by Parents and Creditors. Individuals partici-
pating in an offensive jihad must have these permis-
sions. Persons participating in a defensive jihad, how-
ever, generally do not. The costs of abandoning one’s 
parents, families, properties, and possessions, how-
ever, must be factored in, and the ulema have issued 
divided opinions. 66
8. Impermissibility of Violating a Voluntary Oath of 
Unconditional Allegiance (bay’at) Given to One’s Recog-
nized Ruler. Osama bin Laden knowingly and willfully 
disobeyed then supreme leader of the Taliban regime, 
Mullah Omar, by provoking in word and deed the 
United States, and thus increasing the likelihood that 
Afghanistan would be invaded and a Muslim govern-
ment overthrown. Osama bin Laden was an invited 
guest enjoying complete security of person, property, 
and liberty of action. His impermissible actions are 
widely viewed as the proximate cause of the removal 
of the Taliban from power, and the calamitous conse-
quences that have resulted from those events.67 
9. The Impermissibility of Waging Offensive Jihad 
Under Present Conditions of Muslim Weakness vis-à-vis 
the Infidel Powers. Jihad-realism is not a suicide pact, 
and the present power imbalance between Muslim 
and non-Muslim parties recommends against violent 
means. Other alternatives are available to Muslims 
“short of war” for advancing the Muslim cause. Un-
til objective conditions favoring military action exist, 
these alternatives are both permissible and desirable.68
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10. The Permissibility of Jihad, Emigration, or a Truce, 
When Facing Infidel Occupation. A defensive jihad is 
understood to be an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) that 
devolves on every believer. However, it may be that 
the costs of such a jihad outweigh the benefits, and 
other courses of action are legally permissible.69 
11. The Impermissibility of Attacking Civilians of an 
Occupying Country in the Name of Jihad or Under Its Ban-
ner. This is the central legal question of greatest interest 
to Americans and American policymakers. Regardless 
of whether a country is presumed to be an occupying 
country, in this case the presumption by al-Qaeda that 
the United States is “occupying Muslim lands,” it is 
impermissible to harm civilians or combatants in that 
home country.70
12. The Imprudence of al-Qaeda Based and Inspired Ter-
rorism. Behind virtually every legal discussion above 
is the implicit relation between law and life. Law that 
does not support life does not last. Religious principles 
that are radically at odds with the reality principle—
the conditions of the world as they exist in reality, not 
in fantasy or wish-projection—either reinterpret these 
principles, reform them, or become of mere antiquar-
ian interest. A pragmatic, prudential substrate exists 
in Islam, as in every other great faith, that relates de-
sired ends to available means, and evaluates courses 
of action in relation to the actual benefits that arise for 
its intended beneficiaries. It is on these grounds that 
the events occurring on September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
are arguably the most calamitous, catastrophic blow 
against Islam. A Muslim who is deeply observant, but 
also wisely pragmatic may then ask: How has Osama 
Bin Laden’s so-called jihad benefitted Islam? What 
has been the cost to Islam and Muslims worldwide 
of al-Qaeda’s unilateral decision to declare, launch, 
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and wage a reign of terror whose principal victims are 
noncombatant civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim? 
The answer is not hard to find. The mind of the world 
is not focused on Islam as a majestic, deeply law-
abiding, religion of peace, mercy, and justice; but on a 
religion whose reputation has now been perverted by 
its association with intolerance, fanaticism, and terror. 
Bin Laden’s gift has not been to expand the sphere of 
those prepared to hear and respond to the Muslim call 
but those prepared—by the ignominy of 9/11, and re-
ligious ignorance in the West regarding Islam’s actual 
moral soul—to resist it, and indeed extinguish it.71
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Conclusion.
1. Several variables affect the demise and eventual 
destruction of terrorist organizations. The tactical im-
plosion and marginalization of al-Qaeda based and 
inspired terrorism is a necessary but insufficient con-
dition for ending al-Qaeda. 
2. The 9/11 Report identifies three key strategic ob-
jectives—decapitation, de-radicalization, and home-
land security/resilience—as keys to defeating al-Qa-
eda, and while the first and third have been notably 
successful, the second objective has been relatively 
less so. 
3. Approaches to counterradicalization that rely on 
so-called counterideological or counternarrative ap-
proaches miss their mark: they presume ending al-Qa-
eda’s reign of terror requires that Islam as a religious 
faith delegitimize core Islamic and Islamist tenets, 
including key planks anchoring religious faith, in-
cluding a Past-Perfect, Present-Imperfect, and Future-
20
to-be-Perfect belief system that demands the right 
and duty to make Allah’s word Supreme; they fail to 
acknowledge and engage the breadth and depth of 
nonreligiously motivated opposition to existing U.S. 
foreign and military policy, especially in the Middle 
East and the Israel-Palestine conflict; and most spe-
cifically, counternarrative approaches unnecessarily 
burden this tactical objective by casting their net far 
too wide and capturing a vast Islamic, Islamist, and 
salafist universe whose adherents are overwhelmingly 
morally repelled by al-Qaeda’s reign of terror. 
4. Islam is a law-centered religious faith that pro-
scribes and prescribes human conduct. The jihad—the 
religious prescription to struggle and strive in the 
path/way of Allah until Allah’s word reigns supreme 
throughout the earth—including its military sense is, 
despite disavowal in popular piety and much modern 
moderate Islamic discourse, a binding religious pre-
scription. This presumption is an essential starting-
point in potentially delegitimizing al-Qaeda’s reign of 
terror among adherents for whom shari’a compliance 
is an essential requirement to wage lawful jihad. 
5. Recent important jurisprudential debates among 
jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several 
conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qae-
da’s reign of terror as both unlawful, and imprudent. 
The majority of those conclusions arise from recent 
decades of prison debates in Muslim-majority societ-
ies over the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics 
of violent rebellion against existing governments in 
Muslim-majority societies. Among the most impor-
tant shari’a violations are: (1) The impermissible re-
jection of scholarly authority; (2) The impermissibility 
of extremism and fanaticism; (3) Murdering Muslims 
is haram; (4) The impermissible declarations of takfir; 
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(5) The impermissibility of violating the lives, prop-
erty, and honor of non-Muslims granted promises of 
security; (6) The religiously ignorant, impermissible, 
and pragmatically disastrous isolation of jihad as a 
means of promoting Allah’s word; (7) Impermissibility 
of rejecting the modern state’s prerogative to exercise 
political authority and wage jihad; (8) Impermissible 
extremism in the exercise of the right to retribution 
(the “principle of justice”); and, (9) The general imper-
missibility of violent rebellion against a ruler, and its 
necessary conditions specified.
6. These rulings may be complimented with addi-
tional ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining 
al-Qaeda’s reign of terror directed principally against 
noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority so-
cieties. Among the latter, the most decisive legal ob-
jections include: (1) The murder of persons is haram; 
(2) The impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and 
non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children, 
the elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3) 
The impermissible extension of the principle of Tartar-
rus; (4) The impermissibility of treachery, violation of 
oaths, and pacts of security granted (implicitly, or ex-
plicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim majority societies; 
(5) Jihad is impermissible unless specific capacities, 
conditions, and circumstances, are present; (6) Per-
missibility to wage offensive jihad must be granted by 
parents and creditors; (7) Impermissibility of violat-
ing a voluntary oath of unconditional allegiance and 
obedience (bay’at) given to one’s recognized ruler; (8) 
The impermissibility of waging offensive jihad under 
present conditions of Muslim weakness vis-à-vis the 
infidel powers; (9) The permissibility of jihad, emigra-
tion, or a truce, when facing infidel occupation; (10) 
The impermissibility of attacking American civilians 
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of an occupying country in the name of jihad or un-
der its banner; and, (11) The imprudence of al-Qaeda 
based and inspired terrorism. 
Policy Suggestions.
1. Give due regard to the key role that jihad-realist 
jurisprudential debates hold for contributing to the 
tactical implosion and marginalization of al-Qaeda’s 
reign of terror.
2. Owing to present hostility directed in many 
quarters against U.S. policies in the Middle East and 
Muslim world generally, and the Israel-Palestine 
conflict in particular, it is extremely inadvisable for 
the United States to openly promote or publicize any 
of these initiatives. A key, indeed essential, ingredi-
ent for the authority of these findings is that they are 
viewed as absolutely untainted by any interest, factor, 
force, or power; rather, these debates rest on the legiti-
macy of the shari’a and involve credentialed actors of 
immense stature and learning.
3. Those charged with strategic communication, 
public diplomacy, and messaging generally to pro-
mote United States interests should develop the so-
phistication, capacities, and motivation, to systemati-
cally analyze how jihad-realism and a jurisprudence 
of jihad, may be leveraged for, and not against, these 
interests. 
4. The proper counternarrative frame is not “genu-
ine peaceful pro-Western mainstream Muslim seeking 
liberal democratic freedoms versus jihadist violent 
killer seeking the destruction of Western civilization.” 
While relevant to some targets—those for whom 
Western cultural modernity is a value, and the shari’a 
of customary or merely historic interest—this coun-
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ternarrative is not the one to defeat the religiously 
learned for whom living and dying to promote the 
word of Allah as supreme, is Islam. The debate is one 
within militant Islamism over the lawfulness of al-Qa-
eda’s methods. It is about whether terrorism is haram, 
and has done virtually incalculable damage to Islam’s 
global image; or it is fard, and an essential condition 
of being a True Mujahid and advancing the Muslim 
Umma. In this battle it is, ironically, the learned, jihad-
realist jurisprudents—lovers of religious truth, and re-
ligious law—whose spirit most resembles that of our 
own learned constitutional scholars. It is the law that 
they love first, because law is a condition of life; of 
security; of any reasonable attempt to fashion a last-
ing and just social order. Impatience and imprudence 
have always been enemies of the law. It is in essence 
the law’s revenge that is finally wreaking havoc, along 
with those several other causes, on al-Qaeda’s reign of 
terror. 
It is advisable that the United States do everything 
within its power to make the case to the Muslim-ma-
jority countries, and the Muslim-minority populations 
in the Muslim diaspora, that as a country we are on 
the side of the lawful and the just, and that we actively 
seek and promote solutions to long-simmering policy 
grievances. Our ability as a nation to openly associ-
ate with any efforts by internal Muslim actors will 
only be the kiss of death until the perception of our 
motivations is altered, and altered fundamentally. No 
amount of spin or messaging matters when daily life 
and its common-sense interpretation contradicts of-
ficial pretensions and pronouncements. One should 
always remember that the “Planes Operation”—the 
momentous event that shook the world and created an 
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alternative one rooted in war-footing and a threatened 
“clash of civilizations” was the work of terrorist entre-
preneurs whose primary goal was to cause as much 
pain to the United States as possible, not because of its 
lack of shari’a compliance; or its infidelity; or its cra-
ven and immoral ways; or its freedoms. But quite the 
opposite, for it was seen—certainly through a mind-
set rooted in paranoia, scapegoating, and a reverse-
demonology—as being the singular superpower actor 
whose support for its ally Israel was the essential con-
dition preventing a resolution of an enduring conflict 
thousands of miles from its borders—not shari’a, but 
retribution; not jihad, but terrorism; not Muslim holy 
war, but terrorist moral rage.72
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ed, hidden shell of a savaged underground conspiratorial van-
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post a video entitled “The Dawn of Imminent Victory,” to jihadist 
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prised of a Past-Perfect Islamic glorious golden age. Third, an ac-
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32
under the Shade of Swords”); 2792-2798 (“Martyrdom, and Para-
dise”); 2833-2834 (“Actual Fighters, and Rewards”). See also Sahih 
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In Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, “The Book of Faith,” chapter 
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Allah’s Messenger [peace be upon him] was asked, “What is the 
best deed?” He replied, “To believe in Allah and His Messenger 
(Muhammad)[peace be upon him].” The questioner then asked, 
33
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G. Smith, “From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship be-
tween a Group’s Value Preferences and Its Liklihood of Engaging 
in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 2004, pp. 
409-437. 
Though this work is admirable in many respects, Burki’s im-
plicit assumption (Shireen K. Burki, “Ceding the Ideological Bat-
tlefield to Al Qaeda: The Absence of an Effective U.S Information 
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that Islamic supremacism begins with medieval Hanbali Fiqh lu-
minary Ibn Taymiyyah, (see p. 350), and not al-Qaeda per se, but a 
shifting mosaic of fundamentalist signifiers must be delegitimat-
ed—i.e., “fundamentalist Islam” (p. 357). “Once the enemy has 
been correctly, and publicly, identified as Islamic fundamentalists 
(i.e., Wahhabists, Salafists, and others). . . a certain type of virulent 
Islamic ideology derivative of Hanbali Fiqh,” (p. 360); “Salafist/
Wahhabi ideology,” (p. 362)—unnecessarily broadens the enemy 
to include enormous chunks of fundamentalist adherents whose 
propensity for terrorism, despite intolerance and supremacism, is 
extremely questionable. 
For scholarly analyses of Salafism and Wahhabism, see for ex-
ample Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Move-
ment, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 generally, but 
especially Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionar-
ies? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” 
Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 244-266; Quintan Wiktorowicz, 
“Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Ter-
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tual Fatawa or al-Wahhab’s actual theological demands, instead 
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often-ignorant or biased commentary. For what the present au-
thor regards as the most sophisticated, persuasive, and nuanced 
critique of the presumption of a fundamentalist-terrorist nexus—
whether Salafi, Wahhabi, or otherwise—see Muhammad Haniff 
Bin-Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work 
against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 
29, 2006, esp. pp. 541-547. 
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Work against Terrorist Ideology,” pp. 537-538, advocates a “theo-
logical and juristic approach” virtually identical to that developed 
by the present author. However, the explicit recognition of jihad 
as a binding religious prescription (jihad realist) and Islamic ju-
risprudence (jurisprudential) or sacred law and shari’a method-
ology concerning behavioral proscriptions, prescriptions, and a 
continuum of lawful conduct—from obligatory (fard) to forbid-
den (haram) and stages in-between—is the vital center-of-gravity 
identified in the present author’s approach. “Theological” too of-
ten connotes more abstract, scholarly investigations into the man-
ner in which the godhead exists, relates to the world and to man 
in the world, as well as debates over the relative rights of human 
reason versus faith in discerning those properties. 
What is key in the above approach is clearly understood by 
both bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological 
Work against Terrorist Ideology,” p. 531, and Wilner, “Deterring 
the Undeterrable,” pp. 26-31, who both amply demonstrate the 
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ideological and nonideological drivers), p. 531. Citing General 
William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma dur-
ing World War II, bin Hassan identifies “morale”—a crucial fac-
tor for the willful disposition of the fighter—as presuming three 
key dimensions: intellectual confidence that “the goal can be at-
tained,” material confidence that “the means of attaining the goal 
are available,” and spiritual confidence “that the cause is just,” 
p. 534. Translated in the vernacular of shari’a-based criteria for 
judging the legality of a jihad, the first two requirements—avail-
able means and probable success—deal with the pragmatics of ji-
had (i.e., Can it be done? Do the benefits outweigh the costs for 
the Umma?). The third requirement, concerns the legality or Is-
lamic legitimacy of jihad (i.e., Is it just? Should it be done? Does the 
shari’a justify this jihad?). Wilner, extending deterrence theory to 
counterterrorism also identifies three key bases underpinning the 
terrorist cost/benefit calculus, two rooted in pragmatics, and the 
third—legitimation (see esp. pp. 26-31)—that demands that ter-
rorist actors root their actions in the moral and legal demands of 
Islamic shari’a. 
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more, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 14-18. 
24. See Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: 
Inciting Muslims Through the War of Ideas, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, available 
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contribution designed to disabuse ignorant, opportunistic, or oth-
erwise dangerously-off-the-mark scholars from egregious stereo-
types and ignorant formulations of essential Islamic and Islamist 
beliefs, practices, concepts, and values. Armed with an accurate 
mapping of actual Islam and Islamism, one can both establish the 
trusted long-term networks essential to the intra-civilizational de-
bates informing Western and Islamic socicultural life, and par-
tially mitigate the damage done to such a project by those seeking, 
on the basis of the wildest and most erroneous premises, an inter-
civilizational war. 
25. For academic accounts of this binding religious prescrip-
tion, see for example: E. Tyan, “Djihad,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 
New Ed., Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1965; David Cook, Understanding 
Jihad, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005; W. Gard-
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Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
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51-137; Rudolph Peters, ed., Jihad: In Classical and Modern Islam: 
A Reader, 2nd Ed., Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener, 2005; Michael 
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NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Richard Bonney, Jihad: From 
Qur’an to bin Laden, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; An-
drew Bostom, ed., The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate 
of Non-Muslims, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005; Stephen Collins 
Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment”: Ignoring What Extremists Say 
About Jihad, Unclassified Master’s thesis submitted to the faculty 
of the National Defense Intelligence College, July 2007; Reuven 
Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999; William Gawthorp, “Dogmatic Basis 
of Jihad and Martyrdom,” Small Wars Journal, July 6, 2011, avail-
able from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/dogmatic-basis-of-jihad-and-
martyrdom, presents a virtual inventory of jihad and martyrdom-
authorizing statements and legal requirements contained in the 
classical sources and commentary. 
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26. See also Alia Brahimi, “Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al 
Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas,” Studies in Conflict and Terror-
ism, Vol. 33, 2010, p. 96, for insistence on placing al-Qaeda’s ter-
rorism within the legal framework of a legitimately declared and 
fought defensive jihad. The connection between the imperative to 
wage jihad, and the requirement that it be waged lawfully, is evi-
dent in the following quote from Sayyid Imam, whose works will 
be discussed at length (see Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exonera-
tion Book Al-Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya, “Twelfth Episode of Sayyid 
Imam: Al-Zawahiri had no Prior Knowledge of 09/11,” appear-
ing in Al Misri Al Yawm in Arabic December 1, 2008 by Ahmad 
Al-Khatib, “The Second man in Al-Qai’ida Turned Osama Bin 
Ladin from a Traitor to a Mujahid to Inherit the Allegiance of his 
Followers,” Part 12, p. 6: “Jihad for Allah’s sake is just, but do not 
allow those people and their likes to auctioneer with this noble 
cause. They push youths to extreme sacrifices and they bring ma-
jor catastrophes on the Muslims even though they most [sic] care-
ful about their personal safety and about reaping benefits without 
realizing the least benefit for Islam and the Muslims.” 
27. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: 
Al Qaeda’s revolt against bin Laden,” The New Republic, June 11, 
2008, p. 17.
28. Ibid., p. 20.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 18.
31. While insufficient in itself, the importance of the legal re-
pudiation of al-Qaeda arising from jihad-realist militants commit-
ted to rigorous adherence to shari’a requirements, is a necessary 
condition for undercutting any conceivable religious warrant. As 
these authors state: “[T]he repudiation of Al Qaeda’s leaders by 
its former religious, military, and political guides will help hasten 
the implosion of the jihadist terrorist movement. . . . And, giv-
en the religio-ideological basis of Al Qaeda’s jihad, the religious 
condemnation now being offered by scholars and fighters once 
close to the organization is arguably the most important develop-
ment in stopping the group’s spread since September 11,” Ibid., 
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p. 21. Quoting Kamal El Helbay, a Muslim Brotherhood leader 
who helped wrest the Finsbury Park, London mosque from its 
shari’a violating former firebrand al-Qaedists’: “No government, 
no police force, is achieving what these [religious] scholars are 
achieving. To defeat terrorism, to convince the radicals . . . you 
have to persuade them that theirs is not the path to paradise,” 
Ibid., p. 21. The difficulty of this task of differentiating lawful jihad 
from unlawful murderous terrorism remains, however, for it is 
not just a matter of convincing, but of first penetrating an extrem-
ist, arrogant, hostile, self-righteous mindset, often entirely igno-
rant of crucial Islamic tenets, and one that is self-insulating since 
all scholars, clerics, and observant Muslims not engaged in the 
terrorist project are viewed as internal enemies. For a real sense of 
the difficulty facing these salafi sheiks, even highly-regarded ones, 
on the front lines—not only among the youth, but from among 
fellow sheikhs, see the article by Sheikh Salman al-Oadah, and 
Comments by Shaykh Yaser Birjas in “UPDATE: Standing United 
Against Terrorism & Al-Qaeda – Salman al-Oudah (with Yasir 
Qadhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basy-
ouni), http://muslimmatters.org/2009/10/12/standing-united-against- 
terrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasir-qadhi-and-yaser-
birjas/.
32. Islamic jurisprudence, which presumes a foundation in 
Fiqh—the science of shari’a (sacred Law)—is, as in other religious 
and secular traditions, highly specialized and contentious owing 
to differing traditions and principles of legal interpretation. The 
authority of a given legal scholar resides in his proven expertise in 
the sources and methods of the shari’a. The four traditional sourc-
es for shari’a comprise, in order of their authority: Qur’an (Islamic 
sacred scripture), Ahadith (traditions of varying soundness and 
quality concerning what Prophet Muhammad, and also his earli-
est companions, said and did), Ijma (unanimous scholarly consen-
sus, which functions like precedent), and Qiyas (the use of simile 
or analogical reasoning). In addition, Tafsir (Qur’anic commen-
taries), Handbooks (handbooks of the various legal schools, e.g., 
Hannafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, that present binding law), and 
Fatawa (compendia containing authoritative legal opinions or ver-
dicts) are used. The range of legal/moral permissibility of a given 
action is five-fold: [1] absolutely required or commanded (fard); 
[2] recommended, but not required (mustahabb); [3] indifferent, 
neutral, permissible (mubah); [4] discouraged or reprehensible, 
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den because both sinful and criminal (haram). See especially John 
Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007, chap. 2, “Shari’a Reasoning,” pp. 43-96; 
“Shari’a” entry in Encylopedia of Islam, New Ed., C. Bosworth, E. 
Donzel, W. Heirichs, and G. Leconte, eds., Vol. 9, Leiden, UK: E. 
J. Brill, 1996, pp. 321-328. Because of the enormous stature of the 
arch-traditionalist, originalist Hanbali Fiqh that is upheld in Saudi 
Arabia, the more conservative Gulf countries, and among jihad-
realist scholars and militants, the most damning case against al-
Qaeda arises when this jurisprudential tradition, which uses the 
two “primary” and most authoritative sources (Qur’an, Ahadith) 
determines that absolutely forbidden sinful, criminal (haram) vio-
lations of the shari’a have occurred. The three key luminaries of 
the Hanbali school: its namesake Ibn Hanbal (d. 855); the great 
medieval scholar and ‘jihadist’ Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328); 
and Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, namesake for the so-called 
Hanbalite ‘Wahhabi’ school (d. 1792); form a theologico-juridico 
backbone against whom contemporary al-Qaedist terrorists run 
afoul, because the teachings of these three key luminaries read-
ily condemn al Qaeda of abominable acts in the strictest Islamic 
terms. For a survey of Hanbali scholars, see, H. Laoust, “Hanabi-
la” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Ed., B. Lewis, V. L. Menage, 
Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1971, Vol. 3, 
pp. 158-162. 
33. Owing to the recognized stature of these jihad-realist 
authorities, and available English-language translations, the fol-
lowing works by present and former members of armed ‘jihad-
ist’ organizations were consulted. For the Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (LIFG): Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), A Selected 
Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document, Transl. Mohammed 
Ali Musawi, Quilliam Foundation, available from http://www.
quilliamfoundation.org/images/a_selected_translation_of_the_lifg.pdf, 
2009. Each work provides a translation of the introductory pas-
sages, which are key to understanding the document's intentions 
and context, as well as providing a translation of the summary 
of each chapter that appears in the original Arabic. The docu-
ment, Revisionist [or Corrective] Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, His-
bah [Accountability], and Takfir [Judging others’ ‘Muslimness’]—is 
approximately 400 pages organized in nine chapters and made 
available to the public on September 6, 2009. Its six authors com-
prise the LIFG’s highest echelon leadership: current emir, Abdul 
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emir, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; spiritual leader, Sami Mus-
tafa Al-Saadi, aka: Abu al-Munzir al Saaidi; its first emir, Miftah 
al-Mbruk al-Thawadi, aka: Abdul Ghaffar; military commander, 
Musafah Al-Said Qunayid, aka: Abu al-Zubair; and, Abdul Wah-
hab Muhammad Qayid, aka: Abu Idris (remarkably, also the 
elder brother of senior al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi). 
The original Arabic text is available online from www.akhbar- 
libyaonline.com.  For background, commentary, and additional 
analysis, see “The Daily Star: Deradicalizing Jihadists, the Lib-
yan Way,” April 26, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov; 
Noman Benotman, “Al-Qaeda: Your Armed Struggle is Over,” 
September 10, 2010, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/
images/stories/pdfs/letter-to-bin-laden.pdf; Rania Karam, “Former 
LIFG leader: Bin Laden lacks Islamic authority to wage ‘West-
ern Jihad,” May 5, 2010, available from www.magharaebia.com; 
Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), “Noman Benotman criticizes 
al-Qaeda in bin Laden letter,” September 23, 2010, available 
from www.magharebia.com; Rania Karam, “Former LIFG leader 
questions bin Laden rationale,” April 29, 2010, available from 
al-shorfa.com; Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), “Al-Qaeda yet to 
respond to corrective studies forbidding killing of civilians,” 
September 15, 2009, available from al-shorfa.com; Camille Tawil, 
“Libya closes the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” 
March 30, 2010, available from al-shorfa.com; Nic Robertson 
and Paul Cruickshank, “In bid to thwart al Qaeda, Libya frees 
three leaders of jihadist group,” March 23, 2010, available from 
edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/23/libya.jihadist.group; Va-
hid Brown, “A First Look at the LIFG Revisions,” September 
14, 2009, available from www.jihadica.com/a-first-look-at-the-lifg- 
revisions/; Camille Tawil, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group’s revisions: one year later,” July 23, 2010, available from 
www.magharebia.com; Jarret Brachman, “Why the LIFG’s Revi-
sions are Falling on Our Deaf Ears,” September 21, 2009, available 
from jarretbrachman.net/?p=1036; Thomas Hegghammer, “Libyan 
Jihad Revisions,” September 8, 2009, available from www.jihadica.
com/libyan-jihad-revisions/; Camille Tawil, “Libyan Islamists Back 
Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi Re-
gime,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7, No. 17, June 18, 2009, available 
from www.jamestown.org; Jarret Brachman, “Abu Yahya al-Libi’s 
‘Human Shields in Modern Jihad’,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 6, 
May 2008, pp. 1-4, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Alison Par-
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CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2009, pp. 7-9, available from 
www.ctc.usma.edu; Paul Cruickshank, “LIFG Revisions Posing 
Critical Challenge to al-Qaeda,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 12, De-
cember 2009, pp. 5-8, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Ian Black, 
“Libya’s jihadis reject violence as leader bids for acceptance,” 
September 4, 2009, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/
sep/04/libyan-islamist-fighters-reject-violence; Oea Online, “Libyan Is-
lamists’ ideology revision serialization to start 6 Sep-paper,” (Text 
of report by Libyan pro-government newspaper Oea: “Oea will, 
as of tomorrow [Sunday 6 September 2009], begin a serialization 
of the ideological revisions ‘corrective studies’ prepared recent-
ly by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG]”),September 6, 
2009, available from www.opensource.gov; Camille Tawil, “Libyan 
Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to Release the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group Prisoners,” Al Hayah Online in Arabic, “Report 
by Kamil al-Tawil, ‘Libyan Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to 
Release the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s Prisoners’,” Febru-
ary 22, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov; BBC Monitoring 
in Arabic, “BBC Monitoring: Review of al-Qaeda Activities in 
North Africa 16 February-1 March [20]11,” available from www.
opensource.gov; Paul Cruickshank, “How Muslim Extremists are 
turning on Osama Bin Laden,” June 7, 2008, available from www.
nydailynews.com.
For the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, the following 
sources by, or commentary on Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-
Sharif's (aka Dr. Fadl, or, Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir Bin-Abd-al-Aziz) 
key jihad-realist revisionist works are: Omar Ashour, The De-
Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Move-
ments, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Is-
lamist Movements, New York: Routledge, 2009, esp. Chaps. 3, 5. For 
brief biographical details on Sayyid Imam, see Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
Online in Arabic, “Report Lists Stages in Life, Career of Egypt’s 
Jihad Group Leader Dr. Fadl” and Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in 
Arabic, “Report: Seven Places Which Made Up Dr. Fadl’s Life, the 
First Amir of Egyptian ‘Jihad’ Organization,” November 19, 2009, 
available from www.opensource.gov. For publicity for the revisions, 
see Al-Misri al-Yawm, “Detained Egyptian Islamist leader urges 
‘rationalization’ of jihad activity,” Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, text 
of report by Ahmad al-Khatib: “Faqih of [Egyptian] Jihad Orga-
nization to announce within days a document on ‘rationalizing 
jihadist actions’,” May 6, 2007, available from www.opensource.
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gov; Al-Sharq al-Wasat, “Egyptian Islamic Group ‘Theoretician’ 
Supports Call for ‘Rationalized’ Jihad,” Al-Sharq al-Wasat in Ara-
bic article by Abdu Zaynah: “’Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah’ Theoreti-
cian in Egypt Supports al-Qaeda Call for Ending Violence,” May 
13, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Al-Misri al-Yawm, 
“Egyptian Islamist lawyer says al-Qaedah to carry out religious 
revisions–paper,” and Al Misri al-Yawm in Arabic excerpt from 
report by Ahmad al-Khatib: “Jihad Organization leaders unani-
mously approve Fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] revisions,” Novem-
ber 3, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov. 
For the two key texts containing the legal requisites of law-
ful jihad: [1] Sayyid Imam, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right 
Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiqat Tarshid 
Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam),  November 2007, serialized in 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially available on www.open-
source.gov; [2] Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exoneration Book [Al-
Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya], completed by the author March 25, 
2008, and published in 13-parts in Arabic by Al-Misri Al-Yawm, 
between November 18-December 2, 2008, available from www.
opensource.gov. See Daniel Lav, “An In-Depth Summary of Sayyid 
Imam’s New Polemic Against Al-Qaeda, ‘Exposing the Exonera-
tion,’ February 23, 2009, available from www.memri.org, for an ac-
curate summary of several key points made in the latter text. 
Though ‘Rationalization’ does indeed contain occasional 
needless ad hominem attacks, three points are worth mention-
ing. First, a careful reading of both texts places these remarks in 
proper context and though perhaps unwise and distracting, they 
do not invalidate Sayyid Imam’s key legal criticisms. Second, the 
vast majority of these ad hominem assaults are directed at Ayman 
al-Zawahiri’s trustworthiness. To the extent that honesty, trust-
worthiness, and commitment to truthfulness are essential disposi-
tional qualities for a person claiming ultimate concern for shari’a, 
evidence to the contrary is potentially devastating. It suggests that 
legal errors do not arise merely from inaccurate, ignorant, or in-
valid inference, but from intentional, willful deception. The origi-
nal “Exposure” book consists of four interlinked chapters, one of 
which focuses virtually exclusively on what Sayyid Imam deems 
“theological inaccuracies,” while the other three deal with ques-
tions bearing directly on motive and character. The linkage of the 
first two chapters is represented thusly, “You also ascertain the 
veracity of what I stated at the start of this chapter [two] in citing 
predecessor ulemas as saying that ‘the statements of a liar and de-
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bauchee are not accepted in religion’. I have demonstrated in the 
first chapter that Al-Zawahiri is a liar who invents and fabricates. 
So what did that liar do when he issued fatwas about Allah’s re-
ligion? You have seen in this chapter [two] how he perpetrated 
monstrosities and heresies that contradict the Shari’a of Islam. His 
monstrosities followed one another until they formed a criminal 
doctrine that allows wholesale killings under various pretexts 
and justifications. . . . Al-Zawahiri ought to have called his book 
‘The Justification’ rather than ‘The Exoneration’. The justification 
they sought to make for their criminal behavior rightly sets the 
foundation for the school of ‘Ignorance and Crime in Jihad’ in our 
times” (Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 7, p. 2). And third, Sayyid 
Imam constructs a coherent explanation that explains both legal 
inaccuracies and intentional deception: that 9/11 and al-Qaeda 
represent in their essential core the personal vendetta of Osama 
bin Laden, and those whose agendas converged with his, e.g., 
Khalid Shaik Muhammad, to inflict the greatest loss of life possi-
ble on the United States. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s legal function then, 
in Sayyid Imam’s opinion, is to produce ‘jurisprudence of justifi-
cation’ legalizing what amounts to a “corrupt doctrine about ex-
cessiveness in wholesale killing” or “a corrupt deviate doctrine 
to entrench excessiveness in spilling of blood, . . . This corrupt 
doctrine is what some call ‘al-Qaeda ideology’” (Sayyid Imam, 
“Exposure,” Part 2, pp. 1-2 , 2-7; Part 3, pp. 3-6; Part 4, entire; Part 
7, p. 6; Part 11, p. 2; Part 13, p. 2-4). 
Second, and in some sense more important, Sayyid Imam in-
dicates the circumstances under which these attacks became more 
likely (see, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 13, pp. 4-5), and they 
are directly related to al-Zawahiri’s attempt to poison the recep-
tion of his “Rationalization,” and therefore prevent the kind of 
genuine scholarly debate that Sayyid Imam believed was essen-
tial for restoring legality and pragmatics to the waging of jihad. 
For the majority of a 10-hour, 2-day exclusive first-ever in-
terview conducted in Turrah Prison, n.d., conducted just after 
release of “Rationalization,” see Al-Hayah,”Egypt’s Dr. Fadl of Al-
Jihad Group Upbraids al-Qaeda’s Al-Zawahiri,” Al-Hayah in Ara-
bic, Part One of a six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-
Aziz al-Sharif: ”Al-Hayah in Eguypt’s Turrah Prison Interviews 
Author of the Document ‘the Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt 
and the World’. Dr. Fadl: ‘Al-Zawahiri Deceived me and was the 
Reason I was Accused in the Al-Sadat Case. I Left Jama’at al Jihad 
After it Insisted on Operations Inside Egypt and Distorted my 
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Book, ‘A Compilation’,” December 8, 2007, available from www.
opensource.com; Al-Hayah, ”Egypt: Former Al-Jihad Ideologue Re-
bukes ‘Leaders Abroad’, Al-Zawahiri,” Al-Hayah in Arabic, Part 
Three of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-
Sharif: “Al-Hayah interviews the Author of the Document ‘Ratio-
nalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.’ Dr. Fadl: al-Qaeda Does 
Not Have a Shari’a Scholar and Al-Zawahiri Turned Al-Jihad 
Members into Mercenaries,” December 10, 2007, available from 
www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah,”Former Al-Jihad Theorist Says 
Document on Rationalization of Jihad Unaswerable,” Al-Hayah 
in Arabic, Part Four of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam 
Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: Al-Hayah Interviews Author of the Docu-
ment “‘Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.” Dr. Fadl: Bin 
Ladin and Al-Zawahiri Are Creations of Intelligence Services and 
Were Playthings in the Hands of the Sudanese and Pakistanis,” 
December 11, 2007, available from www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah, 
“Former Jihad Ideologue Attacks Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, 9/11 
Atrocity,” Al Hayah in Arabic, Part Six of six-part interview with 
Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: “Al-Hayah in the Egyp-
tian Turrah Prison interviews the author of ‘The Rationalization 
of Jihad in Egypt and the World’ document; Dr. Fadl: the victims 
of al-Qaeda through recruitment on the internet fill prisons pur-
poselessly; my advice to Muslim youths: Learn your religion, 
learn your religion; and seek the truth,” December 13, 2007, avail-
able from www.opensource.com. 
For select examples of post-“Rationalization” responses, 
analyses, and commentary, see Al-Misri al-Yawm, “Al-Jihad orga-
nization leaders in the world voice support to Imam’s revisions,” 
Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic text of report by Ahmad al-Khatib 
headlined, “Al-Jihad leaders are anticipating Dr. Fadil’s revisions, 
[Al-Jihad] world leaders support him,” November 15, 2007, avail-
able from www.opensource.gov; Nahdat Misr, “’Rationalization of 
Jihad’ Paper Triggers ‘Crisis’ Among Egyptian Fundamentalists,” 
Nahdat Misr in Arabic: “Hani al-Siba’i: Rationalization of Jihad 
Document Product of Prisons, Lacks Credibility; Abu-Umar Al-
Masri Responds: The Document is a Product of Sympathy, Mercy 
Not Coercion in Prison,” November 20, 2007, available from www.
opensource.gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Report on Reaction of Al-Jihad 
Revisions by Islamists Residing in London,” Report by Ahmad 
Al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic : “Al-Misri al-Yawm 
opens the door for debate on Al-Jihad revisions,” November 23, 
2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Jihadist Websites, “Basir 
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al-Tartusi Questions Shaykh Sayyid Imam’s Words as Revisions, 
Retractions,” Syrian Salafi cleric Abu-Basir al-Tartusi post to jihad-
ist website, November 29, 2007, available from www.opensource.
gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Islamic Group Invites al-Qaeda 
to Commit to Sayyid Imam Revisions, Pins hope on Bin Laden,” 
Report by Ahmad al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic: “The 
Islamic Group Demands Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri to Consider 
Sayyid Imam’s Revisions ‘Seriously’; In the first reaction, Karam 
Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim: The document which Al-Misri Al-
Yawm Published is unprecedented and its impact will reach al-
Qaeda members,” November 19, 2007, available from www.open-
source.gov; MEMRI, “Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaeda’s 
Shari’a Guide to Jihad: 9/11 Was a Sin; A Shari’a Court Should Be 
Set Up to Hold Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri Accountable; There 
Are Only Two Kinds of People in Al Qaeda—The Ignorant and 
Those Who Seek Worldly Gain,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series 
No. 1785, December 14, 2007, available from memri.org; MEMRI, 
“Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaeda’s Shari’a Guide to 
Jihad Sayyed Imam vs. Al Qaeda (2): Al-Zawahari Was Suda-
nese Agent—Sudan’s VP Ali Othman Taha Hired Him to Attack 
Egypt; Ban on Jihad against Egyptian Regime in Egypt; Summary 
of Imam’s New Right Guidance for Jihad Book,” January 25, 2008, 
available from memri.org. For select Western analyses and com-
mentary of this broader “revisionist” trend, see Jarret Brachman, 
“Al Qaeda’s Dissident: How the Prison Writings of Sayyid Imam 
al-Sharif, One of al Qaeda’s Founders Now Labeled a Turn Coat, 
are Doing More to Expose the Terrorist Group’s Hypocrisy than 
Anyone Else,” December 2009, available from www.foreignpoli-
cy.com; Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda 
Mastermind Questions Terrorism,” The New Yorker, June 2, 2008, 
pp. 37-53; Daniel Lav, “The Party of Jurisprudence vs. The Party 
of Action: Sayyed Imam, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the Split in 
the Jihad Movement,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 
144, May 29, 2008, available from www.memri.org; Omar Ashour, 
“Post-Jihadism and the Inevitability of Democratization,” Arab 
Reform bulletin, November 10, 2009, available from carnegieen-
dowment.org/2009/11/10/post-jihadism-and-inevitability-of-democrati-
zation/kry; Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: 
Al Qaeda’s Revolt Against Bin Laden,” The New Republic, June 11, 
2008; Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN, “New Jihad 
Code Threatens Al Qaeda,” November 10, 2009, available from 
edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/Africa/11/09/Libya.jihadi.code/; Khalil 
Al-Anani, “Jihadi Revisionism: Will It Save The World?,” Mid-
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dle East Brief, No. 35, April 2009, pp. 1-7, available from www.
brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB35.pdf; IDC Herzliya, In-
ternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “’Retracting’ – Using 
Ideological Means for Purposes of De-Radicalization,” January 
2011, pp. 1-14, available from www.ict.org.il/Portals/O/Internet%20
Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Deradicalization.pdf. 
The Egyptian Islamic Group’s (Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya) 1997 
cessation of violence, and 2002/2003 revisionist writings, were 
unfortunately not available to this author in English translation. 
For select commentary on Al-Gama’a, see Y. Carmon, Y. Feldner, 
and D. Lav, “The Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: 
An Ideological Reversal,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 
309, December 22, 2006, available from memri.org; Rudolph Peters, 
“The Notion of Jihad at the Turn of the 21st Century,” in R. Peters, 
ed., Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, 2nd Ed., Princ-
eton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, esp. Chap. 3., “The Change 
of Strategy of the Egyptian Jama’a Islamiyya,” pp. 180-183, for 
major revisions in jihad doctrine represented in the 2002/2003 
books away from the notion of kufr al-nizam (the unbelief of the 
regime), and other doctrines; Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An 
Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist 
Movements: the Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group,” The Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 596+, available from 
Academic OneFile, go.galegroup.com.
34. The original article by Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing 
United Against Terrorism & al-Qaeda,” was published September 
21, 2009, available from en.islamtoday.net/print/3490. Apologizing 
for his “harsh words” and “harsh tone—which departs from my 
normal writing style—in order to confront those people who take 
up arms with the purpose of bringing death to numerous people 
and reducing societies to ruin,” his teaser blurb states: “Today, 
I must stress how important it is to condemn the abominable 
and criminal acts being perpetrated around the world in Islam’s 
name.” See also his widely-quoted letter to Bin Laden: Shaykh 
Salman al-Oudah, “Shaykh Salman al-Oudah’s Ramadan Letter 
to Osama bin Laden,” September 18, 2007, available from www.
islamtoday.com/showme2.cfm?cat_id=29&sub_cat_id=1521.
35. Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing United Against Ter-
rorism & al-Qaeda,” was published September 21, 2009, available 
from en.islamtoday.net/print/3490. “UPDATE: Standing United 
Against Terrorism & Al-Qaeda, Salman al-Oudah with Yasir Qa-
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dhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basyouni,” 
March 10, 2009, available from muslimatters.org/2009/10/12/sand-
ing-united-against-terrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasir-
qadhi-and-yaser-birjas.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing United Against 
Terrorism & al-Qaeda,” September 21, 2009, available from 
en.islamtoday.net/print/3490.
40. Al-Hayah, “Former Jihad Ideologue Attacks Bin Laden, 
Al-Zawahiri, 9/11 Atrocity,” Al Hayah in Arabic, Part Six of six-
part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: “Al-
Hayah in the Egyptian Turrah Prison interviews the author of 
‘The Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt and the World’”; Dr. Fadl: 
the victims of al-Qaeda through recruitment on the internet fill 
prisons purposelessly; my advice to Muslim youths: Learn your 
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youth, to be bound by them, and not to fall in the shari’a 
violations of their predecessors, as a result of ignorance 
of religion or deliberate action. 
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‘The Document on Rationalizing Jihadist Action’ [“Rationaliza-
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Knowledge (al-Jami’ fi talab al-‘ilm al-sharif), an 1,100-page work re-
leased in 1993; and third, the fact that Sayyid Imam’s considered 
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and interviews toward positions that fatally undercut the legal 
underpinnings of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi. (See, esp.: Sayyid 
Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right 
Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiqat Tarshid 
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process of killing and being killed” in Islamic jurisprudence, his-
tory, and theology, and also its relative paucity as a tactic during 
the 1970s-90s, there is bare mention of this phenomenon and cer-
tainly not an extended objection on par with others raised. For re-
cent scholarship examining the jurisprudential justifications and 
legal debates involved, see David Jan Slavicek, “Deconstructing 
the Shariatic Justification of Suicide Bombings,” Studies in Con-
flict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, 2008, pp. 553-571; Shireen Khan Burki, 
“Haram or Halal? Islamists’ Use of Suicide Attacks as ‘Jihad’,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, pp. 582-601. See also 
for a concise summary of a recently issued 600-page fatwa issued 
by Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri: “Fatwa on Suicide Bomb-
ings and Terrorism: Table of Contents, Summary & Bibliogra-
phy,” Transl. Shaykh Abdul Aziz Dabbagh, Minhaj Publications, 
February 2010, available from www.minhaj.org.
45. See, for example, LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 2, chs. 5; 
Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, pp. 2-3; ‘Exposure,’ Part 
6, pp. 5-6; Part 13, pp. 6-7. Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 
3, virtually entirely calls into question the shari’a qualifications 
versus ignorance and worldly motives of Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, es-
pecially pp. 3-4. Sayyid Imam’s assertion that al-Qaeda practices 
a “jurisprudence of justification” that privileges illicit ends and 
means, and then opportunistically gathers justificatory sources is 
particularly damning. See, for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rational-
ization,” Part Two, esp. pp. 3-4; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah inter-
view, Part 3, p. 7; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 4. 
46. See especially LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 6.
47. See especially Ibid., ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” 
Part 6, pp. 1-2.
48. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 1, 9; Sayyid Imam, “Ex-
posure,” Part 2, pp. 2-4. This is also the major thrust of “The Am-
man Message,” 2004. The latter is far more ecumenical than that 
proposed by jihad-realist salafi Sunni militants, however, in its 
willingness to embrace all extant schools of jurisprudence, includ-
ing non-Sunni, non-salafi variants.
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49. See LIFG 2009, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, (see, “Rationalization,” 
Part 6, p. 4), outlines and extensively treats the “six proscriptions 
each of which is sufficient on its own to spare the foreigners and 
tourists and not confront them with harm or damage.” Having 
discussed them, he then asks rhetorically: “So how can the situ-
ation be when all these proscriptions or some of them are com-
bined?” According to "Rationalization," Part 3, pp. 4-5, these pro-
scriptions also apply to the financing of jihad:
 
It is regrettable to see that some of those [for whom jihad 
has been waived because they do not have the expens-
es required]imposing on themselves a duty Allah has 
waived for them, and then resort to forbidden routes to 
collect money on the grounds of preparing for jihad. So 
they abduct innocent hostages to demand ransom, or rob 
the money of the ma’sumin [non-Muslims given a pledge 
of safety], and they might kill during the robbery of the 
people whose killing is not allowed. Aggression on the 
money and lives of the ma’sumin is a major sin, so those 
who commit it would have done something they are not 
allowed to do [aggressing on the lives of the ma’sumin] 
to perform a jihad that is not required of them by reli-
gion because of lack of money or other excuses. What 
theology is this? Nay, what mind is this? Is this not but a 
consequence of leadership by the ignorant and asking for 
their fatwas on issues of jihad? . . . [W]e tell all Muslims 
to desist from them, for the sinful acts of burglary and ab-
ductions and other forbidden acts cannot be sanctioned 
under the pretext of financing jihad.
See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4. 
50. See, for example: Mohammad M. Hafez, “Chapter 2: Tac-
tics, Takfir, and anti-Muslim Violence,” in Assaf Moghadam and 
Brian Fishman, eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Discussions 
within al-Qaeda and Its Periphery, Harmony Project, Washington, 
DC: Combating Terrorism Center, December 16, 2010, p. 40: “[E]
ven if certain actions are permissible in Islam, they should not be 
carried out without regard to the circumstances and capabilities of 
Muslims. Actions must be judged according to the balance be-
tween masalih wa mafasid (interests and harms). An action may be 
permissible in abstract,[sic] but when applied in practice it ceases 
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to be wise because its deleterious effects (mafasid) outweigh its 
presumed benefits (masalih).”
51. For example, Sayyid Imam lists the following options ex-
ercised by Prophet Muhammad as examples for those committed 
to upholding the shari’a but unable by ability of circumstance, to 
wage jihad: “These options ranged from disguise, hiding faith, 
going into seclusion, migration to Ethiopia and then Medina, 
pardon, forgiveness, and shunning the mushrikin [polytheistic 
idolaters], and the possibility of hurting the mushrikin by words, 
deeds, and patience on this, to jihad against the kuffar [infidels] 
including the mushrikin, apostates, and People of the Book [Chris-
tians and Jews] by sacrificing self and possessions by tongue, to 
the conclusion of truce and treaties.” And he concludes in refer-
ence to contemporary duties to jihad: “There has been no change 
in any of these options, for all of them are legitimate according to 
the status of the establishment.” Several additional examples of 
the relation of the duty to jihad in relation to actual capacities, and 
other options, are provided in this section.
52. See LIFG 2009, “Revisionism,” Summary of experiences,’ 
chs. 7, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 3, and especially 
Part 4.
53. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 4, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Ex-
posure,” Part 3, p. 2. 
54. See for example: Qur’an 4:43, 105-112; 16:126-127; 20:81-82; 
35:45; 42:37, 40; 67:12-14. 
55. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 6, 8 for rather indirect 
inferences here; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 7, pp. 3-4; 
Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4; Part 4, pp. 4-6; Part 13, p. 5.
56. See especially Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 5 in 
general, and summary at p. 4-7. For the classical and still legally-
compelling refutation of the underlying justification promulgated 
by violent takfiris responsible for Anwar Sadat’s assassination, 
see Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s 
Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Mac-
millan, 1986, pp. 54-62. In brief, the following points are the most 
salient: Only the denial of the Indivisibility and Sovereignty of 
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God disqualifies one as a Muslim (Qur’an 4:116); jihad includes, 
but significantly exceeds, martial fighting; put in its actual context, 
the charge that not ruling based on what God sent down amounts 
to unbelief, was actually addressed to the Jews, not the Muslims 
(Qur’an 5:48); Egypt by any reasonable standard observes Islamic 
dictates and where it does not, persons must remedy that to the 
last detail; there is no support in the Traditions for sanctifying let 
alone prescribing the violent removal of a leader who does per-
form the prayer ceremonies; the so-called sword verse (Qur’an 
9:5) was directed at pagan polytheists, and is wholly inapplicable 
to observant Muslims; it is erroneous to equate the ruling regime 
in Egypt, whatever its faults, with the savage destruction meted 
out to Muslims by the Mongols (Al-Tatar); erroneous and oppor-
tunistic use of Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas; referring to the Faridah 
as a “political pamphlet,” errors are made regarding a de-contex-
tualized and mythologized absolute oath of loyalty owed by an 
adherent to a ruling Caliph, in fact, and the Qur’an is largely silent 
on the precise means of selecting and holding accountable rul-
ers of a Muslim political entity. Moreover, modern circumstances 
now empower the nation-state and its legitimate monopoly of 
violence to act on behalf of the citizenry in matters of war, jus-
tice, and peace; in contrast to a mystical praxis jihad doctrine, 
Islamic jurisprudence upholds the necessity of deep knowledge 
in Islam, and of the world and its circumstances: this is also a 
means of “striving and struggling in the path of Allah” or jihad; 
there is great historical precedent for Muslim cooperation with 
non-Muslims; the author of the Faridah is merely a contemporary 
exponent of a specific deviant movement within Islam—the kha-
warij, or “Kharijis,” whose fanaticism, self-righteous arrogance, 
and violent willingness to takfir virtually all who disagree; and 
finally, in stark contrast to the claim that jihad is a “nonfulfilled 
duty,” he states:
Qur’an and Sunnah, so the Mufti teaches, command 
Muslims to resist the enemies of Islam, but they certainly 
do not order attacks on other Muslims, or on non-Muslim 
compatriots. Jews and Christians must have freedom of 
cult and belief, the Mufti insists. They have the same 
rights as Muslim citizens, he continues. The character 
of jihad, so we must understand, has now changed radi-
cally, because the defense of the country and religion is 
nowadays the duty of the regular army, and this army 
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carries out the collective duty of jihad on behalf of all 
citizens. ‘To conquer oneself and Satan’ is equally part 
of the Muslim duty of jihad, the Mufti adds, while call-
ing other Muslims apostates is not. Whatever the people 
of the Faridah and their sympathizers might say, jihad is, 
according to the Mufti, not a forgotten or absent duty at 
all (p. 60). 
57. Jihad-realist jurisprudential objections—the focus of the 
above—are also complemented by a vast literature comprising 
resolutions, Fatawa, letters, and official rulings, which together 
reinforce many salient points raised above regarding the sinful 
and illegal acts perpetrated by the terrorist enterprise. See, for ex-
ample: The Amman Declaration: King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein 
of Jordan, (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), “The Amman 
Message,” November 9, 2004, available from ammanmessage.com. 
(Now includes “The Official Website of THE AMMAN MES-
SAGE,” available from ammanmessage.com, launched, March 1, 
2007); International Islamic Fiqh Academy, “The Three Points of 
the Amman Message, V. 2,” June 2006, available from ammanmes-
sage.com; The Mardin Conference: Reuters, “Islam Scholars Recast 
Jihadists’ Favorite Fatwa: Declaration is Latest Bid to Counter 
Militant Islam,” March 31, 2010, available from www.alarabiya.net/
save_print.php?print=1&cont_id=104563&lang=en; Muslim World 
League, “Document: What is Jihad? What is Terrorism? Statement 
by Muslim Scholars,”available from www.middle-east-online.com/
English/?cat=main&page=1&id=174; Charles Kurzman, “Islamic 
Statements Against Terrorism,” available from kurzman.unc.edu/
Islamic-statements-against-terrorism/ (Updated November 16, 
2010); Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), “CAIR’s 
Anti-Terrorism Campaigns,” available from www.cair.com/ameri-
canmuslims/antiterrorism.aspx; Sheila Musaji, “Muslim Voices 
Against Extremism and Terrorism– Part 1 – Fatwas and Formal 
Statements by Muslim Scholars & Organizations – updated,” Jan-
uary 28, 2011, available from www.theamericanmuslim.org; 
58. This term “Lord Christ” is very likely a mistranslation 
from the original Arabic text since Muslims, though regarding Je-
sus (Isa) as an immaculately conceived Prophet who revealed the 
Gospel, deny both the lordship and messiahship implied in each 
of those titles.
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59. Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationaliza-
tion [i.e., Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World 
(Wathiqat Tarshid Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam),  Novem-
ber 2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, available from 
www.opensource.gov. Also, Ibid. “In the domain of jihad for the 
sake of Allah the Almighty, this is one of the branches of faith, 
or ‘the peak of Islam’s hump’, as correctly cited from the beloved 
chosen one [Muhammad], Allah’s prayers and peace upon him.” 
60. LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationaliza-
tion” Part 1, p. 2; and especially Part 6 (entire). Though it may 
strike non-Muslims as immoral, a key ground for not targeting 
persons based on nationality includes the possibility that Muslims 
themselves will be harmed: for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rational-
ization,” Part 6, examines six proscriptions against killing non-
Muslims and begins the list with the possibility that a Muslim 
may be among them. Also, “Rationalization,” Part 7, deals again 
with the unlawfulness of conducting bombings in non-Muslim 
countries by first stating that Muslims themselves may be killed 
(p. 1-2; again at pp. 4-5).
61.LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam,‘Rationaliz-
ation’ Part 1, p. 2; and especially Part 6 (entire); Sayyid Imam, 
“Exposure,” Part 4, p. 3; Part 6, p. 5. 
62. Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 5, p. 3; Part 7, exten-
sively discussed at pp. 2, 4-5; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 
4; Part 4, p. 4.
63. LIFG 2009, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, 
p. 2; Sayyid Imam, ‘Rationalization’ Part 5, p. 3; On p. 6, he states: 
“The alternative is not killing civilians, foreigners, tourists, de-
stroying property, or aggression on the blood and property of the 
ma’sumin [inviolable] under the claims of jihad. All this is haram”; 
Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 7, pp. 3-4; Sayyid Imam, Al-
Hayah interview, Part 4, p. 3; On p. 5, Sayyid Imam goes so far as 
to say: 
I say this to those who defend al-Qaeda’s leaders: Your 
friends Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri and their followers 
are treacherous, backstabbing people. God, may He be 
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praised, forbade you to act as advocate for such persons. 
Anyone who admires their deeds is a partner in sin. They 
are now counted as people of weak faith because they 
have committed the major sins of lying and treachery. 
Only a thin line separates them from being outright in-
fidels. The ancient Muslims said that “major sins are the 
path to disbelief.” These sins are the introduction to dis-
belief. God Almighty said: “In the long run evil in the 
extreme will be the end of those who do evil because they 
rejected the Signs of God, and held them up to ridicule” 
[Qur’an 30:10].
See also Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 6, p. 2: “It is inad-
missible for a Muslim to betray the trust of the people of the coun-
try in their blood, honor, or funds, or act treacherously against 
them in the name of jihad. So the 9/11 attacks were wrong and 
contradicted the Islamic shari’a.”; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 
1, p. 3; Part 2, p. 4; Part 5, entire; Part 6, pp. 1-2, 4-6; Part 13, p. 
5; See also, Al Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, “Jihad Mufti Condemns 
09/11 Bombings, Opposes Building Mosque Near Ground Zero,” 
September 18, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov.
64. See, for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 6, 
p. 4: 
We believe that it is by no means permissible to assume 
the right to kill a human being just because he belongs to 
a certain country [killing on nationality]. This heterodoxy 
is without precedent in the heritage of the [Muslim] Na-
tion. Affiliation by an individual to a certain country is no 
proof of his Islam or kufr, for the objective of affiliation 
to nations and similar affiliations is just identification. . . . 
So killing on nationality is a hideous heterodoxy without 
precedent in the heritage of the Nation.
See also Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 3, p. 7: 
[Salah] Some organizations have denied that there are 
groups that select and kill their victims on the basis of na-
tionality. They claim that they carry out these operations 
in the context of their war against the West and the Arab 
regimes. [Al-Sharif] This is not true. al-Qaeda and Bin 
Ladin announced more than once that they target U.S. 
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citizens without discrimination. This is what they did on 
9/11. They killed on the basis of nationality. Groups that 
sympathized with them carried out the Madrid bomb-
ings in 2004, killing Spaniards indiscriminately. In the 
London Underground bombings in 2005, they killed Brit-
ish citizens on the basis of nationality. All this was killing 
on the basis of nationality. Being a citizen of a particular 
country is not proof of disbelief or faith. It is not evidence 
of declaring the lives of certain persons forfeit or that 
their property is forfeit.
See Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4; Part 4, pp. 2-3. 
65. Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, pp. 4-5:
In this great domain, the domain of jihad, the slavery of 
the Muslim to his God the Almighty is [sic] by giving 
precedence to his God’s quest from him over his own 
quest for himself. . . . This is done through the Muslim 
knowing what Allah has made a duty for him at a certain 
time, according to his ability. He gets reward for what he 
is able to do, and he is absolved from the sin of what he 
could not do. This is the way of the Muslims in all affairs, 
on jihad and other issues. . . . [F]or the Muslim to place 
an objective for himself that is beyond his capacity and 
not suitable to his conditions, even if it is legitimate in 
itself, and then follow any road to attain his objective, 
without being bound by the restrictions of Shari’a, then 
would have given precedence to his quest from himself 
over his God’s quest from him. This is not the way of 
the Muslims but the way of the revolutionary secularists. 
In Islam, there is no such thing as ‘the end justifies the 
means’, [sic] even if the end is noble and legitimate to 
begin with. On the contrary, a Muslim worships Allah 
through the means used just as he worships Him through 
the ends sought. If he dies before getting his end, he gets 
the reward for trying, and he is absolved from the sin of 
what he could not do.
In Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 4, this is also extensively 
discussed; see also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 3; Part 3, 
pp. 2-3. 
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66. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Ratio-
nalization,” Part 4, p. pp. 1-2; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, 
pp. 3-4; Part 3, pp. 3-5; Part 10, p. 3.
67. See Sayyid Imam, Al Hayah interview, Part 1, p. 5.
68. Ibid., Part 6, p. 2. Since the law of jihad rules that a “power-
less person in infidel countries is not required to conduct jihad” 
other options must be exercised, including: “engage in a jihad that 
propagates the Islamic call,” and “[i]f they are unable to do that, 
they can repudiate abominable acts in their hearts, which is a duty 
in any case,” or he “can conceal his faith and use what is allowed 
in the shar’iah, like dissimulation.” This key question faced by 
Muslims living in non-Muslim majority societies led to virtually 
an identical response from the salafi “jihadist” cleric Mohammad 
Tahir al-Barqawi (aka Shaykh Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi), i.e., 
he encourages several nonviolent alternatives for promoting the 
Islamic call in Belgium, empowering and protecting the Mus-
lim Umma, and also, interacting on the basis of reciprocity and 
fairness with those who do the same. See Jihadist websites, “Al-
Maqdisi Advises Muslims in Belgium on How to Deal with Non-
Muslim Society,” April 23, 2010, available from www.opensource.
com.
69. See Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 2: 
If an enemy invades a Muslim land jihad against the 
enemy is an individual duty. If Muslims are unable to 
take on jihad, it becomes the duty of neighboring Muslim 
countries, if they are capable of conducting jihad. In case 
they are incapable, Muslims are duty bound to leave the 
country. . . . Whoever is incapable of jihad or emigration, 
may stay in the country and make a truce with the enemy 
without committing sins or harming other Muslims. In 
short, the options are either take on jihad, emigrate, or 
conclude a truce.
See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 3; Part 3, pp. 2-3; 
Part 9, pp. 1-3.
70. See Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 3: 
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The issue of killing civilians of the subjects of countries 
occupying Muslim countries is explained in the docu-
ment [‘Rationalization’]. The gist is that whoever enters 
enemy countries on a visa, even if forged, must not act 
treacherously against the people of that country, betray 
their trust, kill them, or steal their money. It is not admis-
sible to kill civilians or combatants. Ulema do not dis-
agree over this issue. 
See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 6, pp. 3-4; Part 10, p. 5; 
Part 13, p. 5.
71. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 7, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Expo-
sure,” Part 3, p. 1; Part 10, p. 2, 5; Part 12, p. 2, 3. The linkage be-
tween the law, and pragmatics, is clearly stated by Sayyid Imam 
in “Exposure,” Part 10, p. 5: 
[W]hat then would you say about Bin Laden and Al-Za-
wahiri and their followers who betrayed the Emir [vio-
lation of bay’at], hit their enemy in the back [violation 
of security pact, visa], and brought catastrophes to the 
Muslims [pragmatics] destroying groups and States and 
filling graveyards and prisons with Muslims, in addition 
to founding a criminal doctrine to justify wholesale kill-
ing . . . So what do you say to these people? I leave it 
to the Muslims to judge them. A debauched person who 
drinks liquor hurts no one but himself. But the damage of 
those [sic] we refer to is wholesale.
 And again, Sayyid Imam provides this linkage in Sayyid Imam, 
“Exposure,” Part 13, p. 2: 
So Muslim folks do not be deceived by any body [sic] 
who talks about religion and jihad until you judge him 
by Shari’a. . . . So how about those who bring disasters 
to the Muslims, destroy States and groups, adulterate re-
ligion and replace it with heresies and inaccuracies that 
are counter to Allah’s Book, and also cause the killing and 
imprisonment of tens of thousands of Muslims? How are 
they to be described? What good is it to demolish two 
buildings in the United States and it [the US] demolishes 
the Taliban State, the only State in the world that wel-
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comed fugitive Muslims? Bin Ladin then fled and left the 
Afghans to pay the price for his foolhardiness in death, 
homelessness, and large-scale ruin. He sheds tears for the 
children of Palestine and forgets the children of Afghani-
stan whose blood is spilled every day because of him. . . .
See also, Sayyid Imam, in Al Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, “Jihad 
Mufti Condemns 09/11 Bombings, Opposes Building Mosque 
Near Ground Zero,” September 18, 2010, available from www.
opensource.gov.
72. The Israel-Palestine conflict was significantly underplayed 
in the The 9/11 Commission Report, and according to the follow-up 
volume describing the Commission’s inside-story, this was the 
result of a compromise. Thomas A. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 
Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 284-285:
We did, however, have some disagreement over foreign 
policy issues. Much of it revolved around the question of 
Al Qaeda’s motivation. For instance, Lee felt that there 
had to be an acknowledgment that a settlement of the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict was vital to America’s long-term 
relationship with the Islamic world, and that the pres-
ence of American forces in the Middle East was a major 
motivating factor in al Qaeda’s actions. . . . This was sen-
sitive ground. Commissioners who argued that al Qaeda 
was motivated primarily by religious ideology—and not 
by opposition to American policies—rejected mentioning 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the report. In their view, 
listing U.S. support for Israel as a root cause of Al Qa-
eda’s opposition to the United States indicated that the 
United States should reassess that policy. To Lee, though, 
it was not a question of altering support for Israel but of 
merely stating a fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
was central to the relations between the Islamic world 
and the United States—and to Bin Ladin’s ideology and 
the support he gained throughout the Islamic world for 
his jihad against America.
Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Report does acknowledge, 
at least with respect to Khalid Sheik Muhammad (KSM), 
this motivation: “ [Ramzi] Yousef’s instant notoriety as 
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the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing inspired KSM to become involved in planning attacks 
against the United States. By his own account, KSM’s 
animus toward the United States stemmed not from his 
experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent 
disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel. 
(Source: The 9/11 Commission Report, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2004, p. 147. 
 
Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center plot, 
as well as others, including the initial planning of the “Planes Op-
eration”—who had earlier failed in an attempt to bomb the Israeli 
embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and whose initial New York tar-
gets were not the World Trade Center but targeting Jewish neigh-
borhoods in Crown Heights and Williamsburg—had this to say as 
a final statement following his conviction for that crime:
We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, de-
clare our responsibility for the explosion on the men-
tioned building. This action was done in response for the 
American political, economical and military support to 
Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator 
countries in the region.
Our demands:
Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to 
Israel.
All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries 
[sic] interior affairs.
. . . The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported 
by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dicta-
torship and terrorism (also supported by America) that 
some countries are practicing against their own people 
must also be faced with terrorism.
The American people must know, that their civilians 
who got killed are not better than those who are getting 
killed by the American weapons and support.
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The American people are responsible for the actions 
of their government and they must question all of the 
crimes that their government is committing against other 
people. Or they – Americans – will be the targets of our 
operations that could diminish them.
We invite all of the people from all countries and all of 
the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this ac-
tion with us to accomplish our just goals.
“IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBI-
TION AGAINST YOU TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE 
AGAINST HIM . . . 
AL-FARBEK AL-ROKN, Abu Bakr Al-Makee (Simon Reeve, The 
New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terror-
ism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999, “Appendix 
Three: A letter from Ramzi Yousef and the other conspirators in 
the World Trade Center bombing, published as received by the 
New York Times four days after the February 1993 explosion,” 
pp. 274-275.) 
 
CNN in its write-up of the final verdict represented facts in the 
following manner: “After three days of deliberation in November, 
a federal jury convicted Yousef and Eyad Ismoil on murder and 
conspiracy charges for their roles in a plot by Islamic extremists 
to topple the trade centers two 110story [sic] towers to punish 
the United States for its support of Israel,” available from articles.
cnn.com/1998-01-08/us/9801 08 yousef 1 trade-center-bombing-yousef-
and-eyad-ismoil-conviction-S=PM:US. For a chillingly-prescient, 
sympathetic account of Yousef’s motives, but not tactics, see Jude 
Wanniski, “The mind of a terrorist” September 12, 2001, available 
from www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=10813. 
Finally, at least one of the East Africa Embassy bombers made 
his motives known in published transcripts of the case (See United 
States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United 
States District Court, Southern District of New York, New York, 
October 18, 2001, Sentencing hearing), available from fl1.findlaw.
com/news/findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/usbinldn101801.pdf.
El-Hage’s complicity in the attacks was proved, but based on 
his testimony one learns that policy, not shari’a, primarily moti-
vated him; also, that the killing of innocent human beings—some-
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thing he apparently did not know would happen—is absolutely 
unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants Wadih El Hage, 
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali, 
and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed all received life without parole: 
Odeh’s views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge Leonard B. 
Sand when he states as motives, Mr. Odeh’s opposition to Unit-
ed States’ support of Israel, financially, politically and militarily, 
[and] presence of the “United States military in the holy lands of 
Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa.” At 
p. 113, Judge Sands states: “The attack may have been intended 
to attack American foreign policy, but the victims were innocent 
people. . . .” At pages 115-116, the distinction is made between 
support of al-Qaeda’s military goals and deep regret at loss of in-
nocent civilian life. His attorney, Anthony L. Ricco, states:
He is now prepared to face the sentence that the court 
must impose here. He is very much aware of the sub-
stantial human loss that occurred here. He is not oblivi-
ous to the fact that many people were injured and many 
people died here who were innocent. He acknowledged 
that very early on in the case when he was interrogated. 
He has always expressed that. He does not have remorse, 
your Honor, about his participation in Al Qaeda. That’s 
a difference in his mind. . . . Mohamed Odeh has always 
stated that he was not a part of the execution of the bomb-
ing. He continues in that position today, but that does not 
mean, your Honor, that he is a person who is oblivious to 
the great loss of human life and the great injury that was 
inflicted upon people here (pp. 115-116).
El-Hage, a second defendant, addressed the Court before his 
sentencing with a very revealing, fundamentalist narrative but 
one that appears to recognize the enormity of killing innocents 
and indeed one that exhibits moral revulsion. His view of the 
United States is positive from a Muslim perspective: he repeated-
ly refers to the U.S. as a land where Islam can be freely spread and 
practiced (“Others chose to migrate to other countries, such as the 
U.S., where they can spread the message of Islam freely and in the 
same time support their brothers and sisters who are continuing 
their efforts to apply God’s rules in the Islamic countries,” (p. 139); 
also: “Islam became the fastest growing religion in the U.S., as it is 
in the whole world, all praise be to God first, and to the tolerant, 
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open society here,” (p. 139); also: “Now, even though the Islamic 
system and way of life is for the best of all humanity [sic], devout 
Muslims, as I believe, are not asking to apply it here in the U.S., 
where Muslims are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The 
fact is that they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the 
majority are Muslims. But in those countries, today’s selfish, arro-
gant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want to apply 
their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long story short 
[sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to neglect the Koranic 
laws, substituting them with manmade [sic] laws. The result is 
what we see today. Muslim nations are the weakest, poorest and 
most miserable. That is why, in my opinion, we find devout, com-
mitted Muslims, individuals and groups, working actively to re-
implement God’s rules and guidance” (pp. 137-138). 
As for moral revulsion: “[D]evout Muslims, . . . even in time 
of conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming inno-
cent people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic] 
in the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace 
be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or 
property at time of war (p. 139); and again: 
When the bombings happened in Africa in ’98, my opin-
ion was that that action was extreme and not in accor-
dance with the beliefs that I learned. I made my opin-
ion clear well before I was arrested or charged. Today, 
my opinion is still the same towards what happened in 
Africa and what happened here last month [9/11]. The 
killing of innocent people and noncombatant is radical, 
extreme and cannot be tolerated by any religion, prin-
ciples, beliefs or values. Today I can stand here and say 
that I did not participate or support any extreme conduct 
or any act that violates my beliefs as a devout Muslim. . . 
(pp. 141-142). 
El-Hage at pp. 142-143 identifies “many American policies to-
wards Muslim countries [that] are wrong” including the alleged 
“over one million child [sic] and thousands of innocent people” 
affected by the embargo on Iraq; “the unconditional support of 
the American government to the Israeli government that is kill-
ing innocent Palestinians, taking their land, expelling them and 
destroying their homes” (p. 142); the effect on deeply religious 
Muslims of “having non-Muslim troops on the land of Muslims’ 
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holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the 
world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula” (p. 142). 
He goes on to also say though: “Such policies, in my opinion, 
are wrong and end up breeding unjustified extremism. . . . Many 
Muslims and non-Muslims have expressed the same views. That 
includes the American Muslim community, which I am a member 
of, which is free to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic] 
but without committing or supporting any extreme acts” (pp. 142-
143). And in his defense he also states: “I am still the person who 
avoids radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past” (p. 145). 
[El-Hage had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal 
activity.] 
Bin Laden’s butchery and contrast with El-Hage could not be 
greater. He acknowledges El-Hage: “[He] was one of our brothers 
whom God was kind enough to steer to the path of relief work 
for Afghan refugees. I still remember him, though I have not 
seen him or heard from him for many years. He has nothing to 
do with the U.S. allegations” (FBIS Report, January 2004, “Time 
Magazine Interview with Bin Laden,” January 11, 1999, pp. 83-
86). In stark contrast to El-Hage’s revulsion, Bin Laden answers 
the TIME magazine correspondent’s question, “[H]ow can you 
justify the death of Africans?” (p. 84), by invoking the ‘jihad of 
justification’ and extends the Tartarrus (human shield) doctrine 
to justify the mass murder in Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998, 
of 213 persons, and injuring of 4500; and in Dar as Salam (liter-
ally, “House of Peace”), Tanzania, to 11 dead, and 85 injured.” 
(See United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 
1023, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 
New York, N.Y., March 12, 2001, Superseding Indictment, pp. 43-
44, available from www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/US/US_v_
Osama_bin_Laden_et_al_Superseding Indictment-1.pdf ; 2.pdf; 3.pdf.) 
See, finally, Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of 
Cultures or Clash of Interests, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, esp. pp. 238-242, for several prescient suggestions the 
actual implementation of which may have substantially altered 
the events defining the decade to come.
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